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Abstract  
 
This thesis shows that a monopoly Internet Service Provider will never offer zero-rated 
mobile data plans for homogenous consumers if it cannot ask content providers to pay for 
the traffic increase caused by to zero-rating. Increasing the data allowance will result in 
similar utility gains for the customers than zero-rating some content, with lower or 
identical costs for the Internet Service Provider. When a monopoly Internet Service 
Provider is allowed to collect payments from content providers, prices to both sides of the 
market are determined by the size of the data allowance. Opposing effects of distorted 
consumption towards the zero-rated content and increased total consumption of data mean 
that total welfare effects remain ambiguous and depend on the parameter values. 
 
Tiivistelmä  
 
Tämä pro gradu tutkielma käsittelee mobiilidatasopimuksia, missä Internet-
palveluntarjoaja ei laskee osaa asiakkaidensa datan kulutuksesta heidän kuukausittaiseen 
mobiilidatan rajoitteeseensa (zero-rating). Näytän että monopoli Internet-palveluntarjoaja 
ei voi saada enempää voittoa zero-rating -sopimusten myynnistä kuin tavallisten 
datarajoitteellisten sopimusten myynnistä, mikäli se ei voi vaatia Internet-sisällöntuottajia 
maksamaan zero-ratingin aiheuttamasta kasvaneesta datan käytöstä. Internet-
palveluntarjoaja kykenee saavuttamaan saman lisäarvon mitä zero-rating tuottaa 
kasvattamalla datarajoitteisten sopimusten rajoitetta joko identtisillä tai alhaisemmilla 
kuluilla. Kun monopoli Internet-palveluntarjoaja voi kerätä maksuja Internet-
sisällöntuottajilta, datarajoitteen koko määrittää hinnat markkinoiden molemmilla puolilla. 
Hyvinvointivaikutukset jäävät monitulkintaisiksi ja riippuvat parametrien arvoista, sillä 
niihin vaikuttaa kaksi vastakkaista voimaa: hyvinvointia vähentävä zero-ratetun sisällön 
suuntaan vääristynyt kulutus ja hyvinvointia lisäävä kasvanut kokonaiskulutus. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The Internet is perhaps the single most important technological change in our society that 
has happened in last few decades. It has allowed us to witness an era of unprecedented 
technological innovation and has completely transformed a myriad of industries. 
Importance of the Internet in modern day does not need more emphasis, it permeates our 
everyday lives thoroughly. Open nature of the Internet allows people from all around the 
world to connect with each other and lets enterprising individuals find large markets not 
bound by national borders. This can be argued to be the main driver behind innovation in 
the age of the Internet.  
 
The openness of the Internet is based on principles of net neutrality. The concept of net 
neutrality demands that all data on the Internet should be treated equally. Companies 
which control our access to the Internet should not control how we lawfully use the 
Internet and that they should not discriminate against content providers’ access to the 
network. (Gilroy, 2018). Our path to the Internet goes through the Internet service 
providers (ISP). ISPs allow us, the end users to connect to the Internet and consume 
content in there hosted by the content providers (CP). Before, the role of the ISPs has been 
just that, to enable our access to the Internet and nothing more. Technical development has 
however allowed the ISPs to better discern between different data packets, allowing them 
to identify what kind of data we use on the Internet and which content providers’ contents 
we visit. This development could allow them to not only provide access to the Internet but 
also to influence how we use the Internet, changing their role from a pathway to 
gatekeepers of the Internet. This possibility has attracted the attention of many national 
regulators which have instituted regulation to make sure that Internet service providers 
adhere to principles of net neutrality.  
 
Net neutrality regulations vary from country to country, but it generally bans certain 
practices which are considered to be discriminatory and against net neutrality. One such 
practice is paid prioritization. Paid prioritization allows the ISPs to sell prioritized access 
to certain content providers, such as Google or Netflix, allowing their customers to connect 
to these services faster than to other content on the Internet. Conversely, the ISPs could, 
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without net neutrality regulation, engage in bandwidth throttling, purposefully slowing 
connection speeds of its customers to certain content on the Internet, or even blocking 
access to certain websites altogether. Net neutrality regulation is a divisive issue with 
proponents of net neutrality arguing that it will safeguard competition and innovation on 
the Internet (Wu, 2003) and opponents argue that government regulation itself threatens 
innovation on the Internet (Kastrenakes, 2017a).  
 
Net neutrality debate has raged fiercely since 2017, garnering a large amount of media 
attention with magazines like Politico and New York Times writing extensively about the 
subject (McGill, 2017 and Kang, 2017b). The debate was sparked after the chairman of 
Federal Communications Commission Ajit Pai announced that FCC would hold a vote 
about demolishing current net neutrality regulation. After the announcement swathes of 
companies, organizations and experts voiced their opinions on net neutrality regulation and 
the proposed vote. (Lessig & McChesney, 2006 and Mullins & Nagesh, 2015) After his 
appointment to chairman of FCC in early 2017 (Shields, 2017) Pai started quickly rolling 
back many Obama era regulations and announced that FCC would stop its investigation 
into AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon (Kang, 2017a). FCC had investigated whether the 
companies engaged in anticompetitive behaviour by favouring their own subsidiaries on 
the Internet over non-affiliated content providers. On 14.12.2017 FCC voted 3-2 to end 
Open Internet order of 2015. Open Internet order had prevented ISPs from selling paid 
prioritization access to content providers or throttling access to any content (Kastrenakes, 
2017b).  
 
The order also classified Internet service providers as common carriers in accordance with 
Communications Act of 1934 Title II (United States Communications Act, 1934). 
Classifying ISPs as common carriers likened them to traditional telecommunications 
companies setting a considerably stricter regulatory framework for them than before. Even 
though FCC repealed the Open Internet order, future of net neutrality in the United States 
is not yet clear. Several lawsuits have been launched, aiming to keep the net neutrality 
rules intact and some states have passed or considered passing legislation to preserve net 
neutrality regulation (Reardon 2018). When the new lighter Internet regulations come into 
effect in the United States, the ISPs have new powerful tools in use. They are allowed to 
engage in paid prioritization and bandwidth throttling. While the new regulation means 
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that they are no longer expressively prohibited to engage in these practices, they are still 
subject to US antitrust regulation (Kastrenakes, 2017a). 
 
ISPs rarely set data-allowances for their customers with fixed broadband data plans. These 
plans allow for unlimited consumption of data. Mobile Internet plans often have data-
allowances, which allow for a limited amount of data consumption per month. These kinds 
of plans, data cap plans, can be subject to another discriminatory practice known as zero-
rating. An ISP can zero-rate certain content on the Internet. This means that when 
customers of the ISP consume content on the Internet, their consumption of the zero-rated 
content does not count towards their monthly data allowances. When an ISP has zero-rated 
a content provider such as YouTube, any data used to stream videos from YouTube does 
not count towards their monthly data limit and customers of the ISP are free to use their 
data allowance to other content on the Internet. Zero-rating essentially allows the ISPs to 
choose certain content providers which content the end users can consume without limits, 
while still having to adhere to their data-allowances when consuming other content on the 
Internet.  
 
Zero-rating violates principles of the net neutrality as it does not treat all data equally. 
Zero-rated contracts, however, differ from paid prioritization, since it treats data differently 
in respect to price while paid prioritization, bandwidth throttling, and other practices treat 
data unequally based on access or speed of access to content. Even though the practice can 
be seen as violating principles of net neutrality it is often allowed even in regulatory 
regimes which otherwise implement strict prohibitions against behaviour which violates 
principles of net neutrality. European Union, which has its own net neutrality regulation 
(BEREC, 2016), allows ISPs to zero-rate content and zero-rating practices were allowed in 
the US even before FCC dismantled the Open Internet order. 
 
While zero-rating does not sound ominous at the first glance, there are some concerns 
regarding the practice. Zero-rating content makes the content effectively cheaper for 
consumers to use since there is no opportunity cost in form of data cap. This is liable to 
increase demand for the zero-rated content, possibly at the expense of other competing 
CPs. This creates a lucrative business opportunity for the ISPs. They have an ability to 
increase demand for any content on the Internet and can ask the content providers to pay 
them in exchange for zero-rating their content. This practice is known as sponsored data 
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since content providers effectively sponsor the data consumption in their websites and 
applications to customers of the ISPs. 
 
The focus of this thesis is to provide a framework for pricing zero-rated mobile data plans. 
I will describe how monopoly ISP sets prices for zero-rated plans when they are not 
allowed to charge payments from content providers and how the prices are set both for the 
end users and content providers with sponsored data plans. This thesis will show that a 
monopoly ISP will never offer zero-rated mobile data plans over data cap plans if it cannot 
extract payments from the content providers if it cannot obtain other secondary benefits 
from the zero-rating. Additionally, it will show what forces affect the prices that a 
monopoly ISP sets to end users and content providers when it can collect payments from 
both parties. The framework also allows for some discussion about potential welfare 
effects of sponsored data and finds that changes in welfare mainly depend on how much 
zero-rating increases total data usage and how much it will distort consumption of the end 
users compared to unlimited mobile data plans. 
 
Section I of the thesis discusses literature related to net neutrality and zero-rated plans. 
Section II provides a glance to mobile data markets both in Europe and US and discusses 
zero-rate practices in these markets. Section III shows that a monopoly ISP never prefers 
zero-rated plans over data cap plans. Section IV shows how the ISP sets prices and data 
allowances when it can collect payments from CPs. Section V offers numerical solutions to 
the framework provided in Section IV. Section VI discusses welfare effects of sponsored 
data. In Section VII, I discuss limitations of the study, possible reasons why Internet 
service providers offer zero-rated plans even without transfers between ISPs and CPs, 
despite Section III suggesting otherwise, and offer suggestions for future research. Section 
VIII concludes.  
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Section I: Related Literature  
 
Consumption of Internet content differs vastly from consumption of common, non-Internet 
goods. The Internet cannot be treated as a common good that is consumed, but more as a 
network between end and content providers. Nature of the Internet as a network means that 
end users gain little to none benefit from just the act of being able to access the Internet, 
they derive utility from consuming Internet content provided by third parties. Just as end 
users end users, content providers do not benefit just by existing in the realm of the 
Internet. Content providers gain benefit by being accessed by the end users, as their visits 
to their websites or applications generate revenue or other benefits for them. Neither party 
benefits from being on the Internet alone and needs the other side. This networked nature 
of the Internet and cross-group externalities arising from it means that economists often 
find that studying the Internet is often best done through lenses of two-sided markets. (For 
example, see Economides & Tåg 2012, Choi & Kim 2010 and Jullien & Sand-Zantman 
2018). 
 
When net neutrality regulation is studied it is often assumed that there are some 
prohibitions in place for the behaviour of the networks, i.e. the ISPs. Usually, it is assumed 
that when net neutrality is in place that the ISP cannot ask payments from the content 
providers in exchange to access to the network. Additionally, it is often assumed that the 
ISP cannot prioritize or throttle any content in their network or free some content from data 
allowance that they have set to their customers. 
 
Even when the residential ISPs are not allowed to charge access fees from content 
providers, the CPs do not access the Internet for free. Larger CPs generally own large 
server farms which host their content, while smaller CPs buy hosting services from 
companies dedicated to this. (Lee & Wu 2009 and Becker et al. 2010) The important 
distinction is that even when the CP make payments to ISPs, the payments are for being 
able to exist in the domain of the Internet, a prerequisite of being able to be accessed by 
end users using various networks. Access charge set by residential ISP differs from these 
charges as now the network requires payment from the CP, which already exist on the 
Internet, in exchange for the network allowing its customers to access the CP. Payments 
made by the CPs to hosting services are often omitted in research, as they happen outside 
of the networks which are often in the centre of the research. 
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Net Neutrality and Two-Sided Networks 
 
General notions about two-sided market generally apply when studying effects of net 
neutrality. In his seminal paper: Competition in Two-Sided Markets, Armstrong (2006) 
outlined three factors affecting prices in two-sided markets. The relative size of cross-
group externalities, the pricing structure of the network and in case of multiple competing 
networks, whether the two sides of the market aim to join only one or all networks. 
Armstrong argued that when cross-group externalities are different between the two 
groups, one group benefiting more from the presence of the other group than vice versa, 
prices for the group who gains less are determined by the benefit of the other group and not 
their own benefit, creating a downward pressure for the prices.  
 
The pricing structure of the network has an effect on the pricing when there are multiple 
competing networks. If the networks charge groups lump-sum access fees to the network, 
the groups keep the benefit from network externalities for their selves. Networks can 
alternatively set per transaction fees, having the fees for groups to depend on how well the 
network performs on the other side of the market. With per transaction charges the network 
can extract some of the cross-group externalities and is able to set prices higher than with 
just lump-sum charges.  
 
When there are multiple networks competing for same customers, whether the groups are 
single-homing or multi-homing affects the prices faced by these groups. Single-homing 
groups will never join more than one network while multi-homing groups will aim to join 
all networks. Armstrong argues that Internet is best described by “competitive bottleneck” 
-model where the end users are single homing, since people do not need to subscribe to 
multiple data plans in order to access the Internet, while content providers are multi-
homing, since content providers want to be able to be accessed from customers of all ISPs. 
Competitive bottlenecks lead to a situation where the ISPs charge multi-homing group 
monopoly prices, as the multi-homing group will join all networks either way while 
competing over the single-homing group and passing some of the profits gained from the 
multi-homing side to the single-homing side in form of low prices. (Armstrong, 2006 and 
Rochet & Tirole, 2003). 
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Paid Prioritization 
 
Effects of net neutrality have been studied by various scholars in the last decade. The focus 
of the research has often been in paid prioritization, a practice of the ISPs giving priority 
for data packets of specific CPs in their network. Results from the research have often been 
ambiguous, with theoretical models suggesting that discarding net neutrality regulation 
would increase total welfare under some parameter values and decrease total welfare under 
other, (Economides & Tåg 2012 and Choi & Kim, 2010) while others have found that total 
welfare either increases or remains unchanged when paid prioritization is allowed (Cheng 
et al. 2011). While changes in total welfare and consumer surplus often remain ambiguous, 
paid prioritization clearly sets the ISPs as winners and CPs as losers. ISPs get access to a 
new revenue stream, and while some CPs benefit from the paid prioritization, ISPs are able 
to extract part of this surplus, as the CPs are often seen as being the multi-homing side in 
competitive bottlenecks. Cheng et al. (2011) note that this mirrors views about net 
neutrality and paid prioritization presented by ISPs and CPs, with former decidedly against 
net neutrality regulation and latter generally favouring such regulation.  
 
Effects of paid prioritization are similar to effects of access fees to CPs. For example, 
Economides and Tåg (2012) find that, in monopoly setting, consumer surplus is higher 
with access fees since the network can set lower prices for the end users when it charges 
content providers. While these access fees lead to some content providers leaving the 
network, reducing consumer surplus, the authors argue that effect of lower prices dominate 
the effect of lower content provision.  
 
Investment Incentives 
 
One common argument found from the ISP side of the debate is that net neutrality reduces 
investment incentives for the ISPs. For example, Edward Whitacre, then CEO of SBC 
Telecommunications (now AT&T) commented in 2005 to Bloomberg that: “How do you 
think they're going to get to customers? Through a broadband pipe. Cable companies have 
them. We have them. Now what they would like to do is use my pipes free, but I ain't going 
to let them do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return on it. 
So there's going to have to be some mechanism for these people who use these pipes to pay 
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for the portion they're using. Why should they be allowed to use my pipes? (O’Connell, 
2005)  
 
Arguments like that of Whitacre have sparked debate among scholars on investment 
incentives of the ISPs under different regulatory regimes. Cheng et al. (2011) find that 
investment incentives of the ISPs are stronger with net neutrality than without it and argue 
that “This goes against the assertion of the broadband service providers that under net 
neutrality, they have limited incentive to expand.” Choi & Kim (2010) found that 
capacity expansion without net neutrality is affected by two opposing effects. By 
expanding capacity thus reducing congestion in the network, the ISP can increase 
payments it collects from the end users but is also discouraged from investing in additional 
capacity, as it reduces benefits that it can offer with paid prioritization. With less congested 
network wait times for content are reduced and the CPs are less willing to pay for having 
first priority of data packet delivery in case of congestion. Krämer & Wiewiorra (2012) 
have a different take on investment incentives, they argue that paid prioritization will be 
beneficial in the short run and in the long run increase investment incentives of the ISPs. 
However, both Choi & Kim (2010) and Krämer & Wiewiorra (2012) find that paid 
prioritization reduces investment incentives of content providers. With net neutrality, the 
CPs can keep all returns on their investments but under discriminatory regime the ISPs can 
extract part of their surplus, lowering their investment incentives. 
 
Zero-Rating 
 
Effects of paid prioritization and pure access charges to the CPs have been studied 
extensively before, but the issue of zero-rating or sponsored data has been left with 
relatively little attention, until recently. While general issues with sponsored data have 
been discussed extensively before, for example by Schewick (2014 and 2016), Lee & Wu 
(2009) and Yoo (2016), there are only a few formal theoretical models describing the 
effects of zero-rating. Of the few formal models out there, Somogyi (2017) and Jullien & 
Sand-Zantman (2018) found similar results, even with relatively different approaches. 
Somogyi argues that total surplus is increased with sponsored data over net neutrality 
setting under certain parameter values and reduced under others, finding similar to ones 
from Jullien & Sand-Zantman who argue that total welfare effects remain ambiguous. 
Somogyi found that content is likely to be zero-rated when it is either very preferred by the 
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end users or very unfavoured by the end users and that total surplus increases when the 
content is preferred but reduced when the unfavoured content is zero-rated. The result is 
similar to findings of Jullien & Sand-Zantman, who note that in their setting with high-
margin and low-margin content providers, the network needs to distort consumption of low 
margin content to induce high-margin CPs to choose sponsored data option. This is a 
common result in price discrimination settings where the situation of the “low” group 
needs to be worsened to reduce rent extraction ability of “high” group. The general sense 
with both articles is that when the share of the content that will not be zero-rated is large 
enough, the benefits of an increase in total consumption do not eclipse the benefits from 
distorted consumption. Jullien & Sand-Zantman additionally find that the general 
principles of two-sided markets apply for sponsored data too. In competitive bottleneck 
situations, networks that offer zero-rating will set low prices for the end users to 
incentivize them to join their networks by transferring their profits from the content 
provider side.  
 
Outside of theory papers presenting formal mathematical models, the study of sponsored 
data is often focused on potentially harmful effects of zero-rating, especially on CP side. 
Barbara van Schewick, professor of Law at Stanford Law School, claims that even though 
sponsored data practice differs from paid prioritization, the same discriminatory effects 
apply. (Schewick 2014, Schewick 2016). In her report: T-Mobile’s Binge On violates Key 
Net Neutrality Principles (2016), Schewick argues that such programs limit competition, 
free expression, user choice, and innovation, especially harming small-players, non-
commercial providers, and start-ups. She notes that Binge On does not offer a meaningful 
choice between consumption of normal and zero-rated video content. T-Mobile’s lowest 
qualifying mobile plan allows approximately 9 minutes of video content consumption per 
day (4.5 hours monthly) and Binge On allows T-Mobile’s customers to consume unlimited 
amounts of Binge On qualifying content. Cheng et al. (2011) arrive at similar conclusions 
as Schewick. They argue that without net neutrality commercial actors will gain more 
ground on the Internet, as they have better ability to pay for preferential treatment, hurting 
non-profit CPs and the end users which prefer them. Schewick’s argument on harm to 
innovation is also supported by Vincent Cerf, Chief Evangelist at Google (Cerf, 2006) who 
stated that innovation in the Internet is not done in the centre of the network but in the 
“edges”, meaning that openness and non-discriminatory nature of the Internet are the 
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reasons for innovations and growth of the Internet, echoing End-to-End arguments 
presented by Saltzer et al. in 1984. 
 
Net Neutrality and Competition 
 
Scholars have been split in their views on whether discriminatory networks harm 
innovation or whether they will reduce competition in CP markets. Boliek (2009) finds that 
especially in mobile networks traditional concerns of net neutrality proponents do not 
apply since they are aimed more towards fixed cable access networks where competition is 
scarce. She argues that “Regulators and analysts alike have consistently found present-day 
mobile communications market to be competitive”, a notion that is also supported by 
FCC’s Twentieth Mobile Wireless Competition Report (2017). A lighter regulatory 
approach has been championed by Becker et al. (2010), who argue that instead of more 
stringent net neutrality regulation, competitive authorities coupled with some light 
regulation are enough to deal with potential competitive concerns that discriminatory 
networks might cause. While Boliek (2009) finds that there isn’t much empirical evidence 
suggesting that discriminatory practices on the Internet have created barriers of entry or 
reduced innovation, especially Wu (2003) and Lee & Wu (2009) have argued against 
discriminatory networks. Lee & Wu (2009) see that net neutrality safeguards entry of new 
CPs to the Internet and that it has been important for innovation on the Internet. Wu (2003) 
even likens net neutrality to Darwinian competition, where all forms of using the Internet 
are allowed and only the best survive. Competition between CPs will lead to best content 
being offered to the end users, against short-term benefits of the networks.  
 
Additional concern presented by Lee & Wu (2009) is fragmentation of the Internet. 
Without net neutrality, discriminatory practices such as paid prioritization, sponsored data 
and even blocking access to certain sites might become commonplace. Fragmented 
Internet would mean that all end users would no longer have meaningful ways of accessing 
the same content on the Internet. Content that the end users could be able to access or 
would be incentivized to access would be determined by their choice of ISP. 
Fragmentation of the Internet is not seen in a negative light by everyone. Yoo (2016), 
argues that consumers can benefit from service differentiation. A discriminatory system 
can allow the networks to supply varying services to consumers who have different tastes. 
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Additionally, the CP side can benefit too “By allowing competitors to target subsegments 
of the overall market that place a higher value on particular services.” (Yoo, 2016) 
 
Net neutrality is a complex issue, evident from the many views that the articles studying it 
have taken. In the end, discussion boils down to two different paths. First, there are articles 
studying total welfare effects of net neutrality from some perspective, often using formal 
mathematical models. The second set of studies focuses on the potential negative effects of 
discriminatory networks, often recognized as the losers in the first set of studies. These 
articles go in depth on the potential losses that end users and content providers might face 
under discriminatory networks and often argue that net neutrality safeguards open internet 
and innovation on the “edge.” While there is no clear consensus on effects of the net 
neutrality it is clear that it is a matter of extreme importance and discarding net neutrality 
could dramatically see how we see and use the Internet. 
  
 15 
Section II: Mobile Data Markets in Europe and United States 
 
Mobile Data Market in Europe 
 
Mobile data markets in Europe are heterogeneous compared to the United States. In the US 
most of the market is controlled by four nationwide companies with regional and local 
Internet service providers sharing only a fraction of the market. Europe however, consists 
of various countries which all have their own unique mobile data markets and diverse set 
of Internet service providers. 
 
Almost every European country has at least three Internet service providers offering 
services, giving end users a choice between operators (World Heritage Encyclopedia). The 
number of choices for the end users is not insignificant since ISPs in four Internet service 
provider markets sell three times more 4G data for 35€ than ISPs operating in markets with 
only three Internet service providers (Rewheel, 2016). 
 
Figure 1, shows that there is a stark difference in price of data between European 
countries. This variation is also mirrored in data usage, in 2015 average monthly mobile 
data usage per person in Finland reached 10 GB while data usage in Germany was at 0.6 
GB per month. (Rewheel, 2016) 
 
Figure 1. 
 
(Rewheel, 2016) 
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Zero-Rating in Europe 
 
Zero-rating plans have become more common in recent years. A report Zero-rating 
practices in broadband markets (Aetha, Oswell & Vahida and DotEcon Ltd., 2017) notes 
that before 2012 zero-rated plans were virtually non-existent in Europe. Figure 2, shows 
that significant growth has happened since. Most European countries had at least 20% of 
their ISPs offering zero-rated contracts in 2017.  
 
Figure 2. The Proportion of Operators Zero-Rating by Country
 
(Aetha, Oswell & Vahida and DotEcon Ltd., 2017) 
 
Content types being zero-rated are as diverse as ISPs zero-rating them. Seen from Figure 
3, most prevalent zero-rated categories in Europe are audio streaming, video streaming, 
text-based communication and social media.  These four categories dominate over all other 
categories and are all zero-rated relatively as often. Of the four categories both social 
media and text messaging are relatively data light activities, while audio streaming can be 
categorized as medium data intensity activity and video streaming as heavily data 
intensive. 
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Figure 3. Prevalence Index Scores for Categories of Zero-Rated Content for Europe
(Aetha, Oswell & Vahida and DotEcon Ltd., 2017) 
 
Mobile Data Market in the United States 
 
The US market is dominated by four nationwide carriers: AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, and 
Sprint. FCC’s Twentieth Mobile Wireless Competition Report (2017) finds that these four 
Internet Service Providers account for over 411 million connections, over 98% of the 
nationwide total. With four nationwide operators and a number of smaller operators, 
coverage and competition situation, measured by the number of operators, seems 
comparable to Europe. The difference is that US nationwide carriers do not operate 
universally within the whole United States. The operators may or may not offer coverage 
within certain areas or regions, leading to less than four options for ISP in some areas. 
Table 1 shows that in 2016 only 1 of 716 Cellular Market Areas in the United States had 
only one mobile wireless provider with over 5% market share operating. With 14.5% of 
total CMAs having 2 service providers, 21.8% having three service providers and four 
63.5% having four or more service providers.  
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Table 1. 
(FCC, 2017) 
 
With only four nationwide ISPs in the US, a comparison between them is easier than in 
Europe. All four companies offer a range of plans, both limited data allowance plans, and 
unlimited plans. Limited plans vary from 0.5 GB per month to over 20 GB. Unlimited 
plans seem to be main products for all four ISPs with heavy promotion in their respective 
websites. Prices of the unlimited plans range from around 60 to 80 USD per month. 
Further price comparison between the ISPs is made harder as details of the plans wary. 
There are differences on how much data their customers are allowed to use with mobile 
hotspot, whether the ISP starts constricting connection speeds after certain data limits are 
exceeded, even in unlimited plans, and so on. Pricing practices of the ISPs also hamper 
more thorough analysis between the mobile carriers. T-Mobile includes taxes and fees in 
their list prices while other three do not. These taxes and fees are not easily calculated and 
are varied by region of the customer. 
 
Zero-rating in the United States 
 
All of the four nationwide carriers have included zero-rating in their mobile data plans. 
The ISPs include zero-rating automatically in all their contracts and do not ask any 
additional fee from their customers in exchange for having their data consumption in these 
sites not counted against their data caps.  
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T-Mobile offers T-Mobile Binge On service for content providers. Content providers are 
not required to pay anything to T-Mobile to be accepted, but they need to meet certain 
technical criteria to qualify. Binge On consist of a large bundle of zero-rated content 
ranging from multiple different news websites to different music and video streaming 
services.  
 
Verizon’s FreeBee Data is a more traditional sponsored data program. Content providers 
are can pay Verizon to be zero-rated. In 2016 Verizon claimed that any brand is able to 
participate in their FreeBee Data program. At the moment, only content that is zero-rated 
seems to be Verizon’s video streaming service Go90, which launched in 2015 with 
intention of attracting millennials (Morgan, 2015). 
 
As Verizon, AT&T also has a sponsored data program where content providers are able to 
pay AT&T to be zero-rated. AT&T zero-rates its own video streaming services DirectTV 
and DirectTV Now, while technically allowing for other content providers to sign up for 
the program. 
 
Sprint does not zero-rate any content at the moment but has made forays into zero-rating 
before. In 2016, Sprint partnered with Fubo TV to offer a bundled subscription zero-rating 
for Copa Americano Soccer Tournament. Sprint customers were able to watch the 
tournament from Fubo TV for free (normally costing 9.99 USD per month) and have that 
data not count towards their data caps (Brodkin, 2016). 
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Section III: Zero-Rating Without Transfers 
 
Mobile data usage takes over half of the total Internet traffic in the world, but data 
allowances are still relatively small even in many developed countries. (Statista, 2018; 
Rewheel, 2016). Combined with the fact that the prominence of zero-rated mobile data 
plans has increased rapidly in both sides of the Atlantic during last few years, means that 
having formal theoretical models explaining how zero-rated plans affects the consumers 
and society at large becomes more important every year. Paid prioritization and bandwidth 
throttling can drastically alter how we use the Internet in the future, but potential issues 
caused by them have been widely known for years and have been studied extensively. The 
practice of zero-rating has not garnered as much attention. It is often seen as less harmful 
practice than paid prioritization or bandwidth throttling, evident from European Union’s 
BEREC net neutrality guidelines banning these practices but allowing zero-rated data plans 
in most situations (BEREC, 2016). Effects of zero-rating practices have been discussed by 
scholars for years but formal models depicting effects of sponsored data have been scarce. 
In addition to research in sponsored data being rare zero-rated plans where the ISP does 
not charge payments from the content providers have been left with little or no attention. 
Section III provides a formal framework which allows us to better understand zero-rating 
in situations where transfers between the ISP and the zero-rated content providers are not 
allowed. 
 
This Section shows that an ISP never offers zero-rated plans to end users if they are not 
allowed to extract payments from CPs in exchange for zero-rating. In this section, zero-
rating signifies the situation where no transfers between the ISP and CPs are allowed. 
Sponsored data is used to specify situation where the ISP can ask payments in exchange 
for zero-rating. Data cap plans will mean limited data allowance plans where the ISP does 
not zero-rate any content. 
 
With net neutrality, the ISP is only allowed to collect payments from end users in 
exchange for providing them a mobile data plan with either a limited data allowance for a 
period or an unlimited data plan. Size of data allowance 𝐾0 determines costs of the ISP 
𝐶(𝐾0). The cost function is assumed to be increasing in 𝐾0 with 𝐶
′(𝐾0) > 0 and 
𝐶′′(𝐾0) < 0. The cost function is assumed to including investments required to network 
capacity so that the network can always meet all demand for data without congestion. With 
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net neutrality profit maximization for the network is reduced to setting 𝐾0 and price for end 
users 𝑃 to profit-maximizing levels based on cost and demand functions.  
 
When the marginal cost of data is identical for all types of mobile data plans, the only 
factor affecting the profits is the price set by the network and by extension, end users’ 
willingness to pay for data. This section will show that end user never values a zero-rated 
plan more than data cap plans or unlimited plans if they lead to same data consumption. 
Identical costs for same amounts of data and same or lower valuation for zero-rated plans 
lead the network never offering zero-rated plans over data cap plans or unlimited data 
plans. 
 
Framework 
 
This thesis uses a modified version of a framework provided by Somogyi (2017). As 
Somogyi, I assume end users to have Cobb-Douglas utility between two competing content 
provider types video provider content 𝑣 and other content 𝑜. Video content can be zero-
rated while other content can never be zero-rated. Both content provider types are assumed 
to consist of a large group of small identical content providers which all receive an equal 
share of the groups’ data demand. End users gain utility from consumption of data from 
the two content categories and are bounded by data allowance set by the network. If the 
network does not set consumption constraint for 𝑣 or any of the data, end users will 
consume up to their maximum consumption point 𝐵. Upon reaching point 𝐵 they will not 
gain any utility from increased consumption.  
 
There is only one monopoly ISP in the market which sells mobile data plans to end users 
with price 𝑃 for 𝐾0 amount of data per period. End users are identical and atomistic and 
divide their data consumption, limited by 𝐾0, between 𝑣 and 𝑜. Video content can be zero-
rated while other will never be zero-rated. With data cap plan and budget constraint 𝐾0, 
end users will consume 𝛼𝐾0 of 𝑣 and (1-𝛼)𝐾0 of 𝑜, the normal Cobb-Douglas 
consumption shares. Identical utility functions between end users allow the monopolist 
network to extract all surplus from the end users by setting the price to match their 
willingness to pay 𝑃 = 𝑈(𝐾0). 
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Zero-rating will, contractually, allow end users to consume an infinite amount of the zero-
rated content. Consumption of the end users is bound by maximum consumption point 𝐵, 
where 𝐾0 ≤ 𝐵, for the total amount of data consumed per period. Combined consumption 
of 𝑣 and 𝑜 cannot exceed this point. Zero-rating has the effect of increasing data 
consumption of end users from 𝐾0 to 𝐵. Consumption of 𝑜 is still bound by data allowance 
𝐾0 and cannot exceed it but can be lower than it. Consumption of 𝑣 is set by the difference 
between 𝐵 and data consumption to 𝑜. 
 
Third mobile data plan type that the network can offer is unlimited data plan. Unlimited 
data plan does not contain data allowance and offers unlimited consumption of data for 
both content types. Unlimited plan will lead to total data consumption of 𝐵. This plan is a 
special case of data cap plan where data allowance 𝐾0 is set to 𝐵.  
 
The ISP only offers one of the three plans. 𝐾0 is identical between the data cap plan and 
the zero-rated plan, set at profit maximizing level for the data cap plan. 
 
As a major difference to the framework presented by Somogyi (2017), I assume that video 
content providers are noncompeting and completely identical. Essentially, they act as one 
content provider without any bargaining power. Removing competition between two 
content providers vying to be zero-rated serves two purposes. First, it reduces the 
mathematical complexity of the models and secondly it allows the model to determine 
surpluses and prices better as a function of the data allowance. The framework also omits 
the assumption that when content is zero-rated the network is congested and total data 
consumption is less than demand for total data. The network is never congested. Cost of 
increasing network capacity due to larger data demand is assumed to be included in the 
cost function of the network. In addition to allowing both end user and 𝑣-type content 
provider prices to be determined endogenously as a function of the data allowance, these 
changes are made to allow the analysis focus more on pricing decisions of the network. 
 
In the context of this framework, consumer surplus does not offer any meaningful insights 
as the network always leaves the end users indifferent between buying the plan or not, 
leaving net consumer surplus at zero. In this thesis, consumer surplus will mean gross 
consumer surplus unless other mentioned. Gross consumer surplus describes how much 
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end users will benefit from the plan before payment to the network. This works as a proxy 
for net consumer surplus for cases where the network cannot extract all CS. It can be 
assumed that increases in net consumer surplus can be roughly proxied by increases in 
gross consumer surplus in the framework of this thesis. 
 
The Model 
 
 
End user utility:    𝑈 = 𝑣𝛼𝑜1−𝛼      (1) 
The budget of data cap plan:   𝑣 + 𝑜 =  𝐾0      (2) 
The budget of zero-rated plan: 𝑣 + 𝑜 = 𝐵 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜 ≤ 𝐾0    (3) 
The budget of unlimited data plan:  𝑣 + 𝑜 = 𝐵      (4) 
 
End users allocate their data consumption to content categories according to their Cobb-
Douglas preferences. Content type’s share of the budget is determined by 𝛼, as the prices 
for both content types are identical. Consuming 1 GB of 𝑣 content will decrease remaining 
data per period as much as consuming 1 GB of 𝑜 content. With data cap plans, the end 
users will consume 𝛼𝐾0 of 𝑣 and (1-𝛼)𝐾0 of 𝑜. An unlimited plan leads to consumption 
distribution of 𝛼𝐵 of 𝑣 and (1-𝛼)𝐵 of 𝑜. The zero-rated plan introduces additional 
constraint 𝑜 ≤ 𝐾0 affecting the data distribution between content types. Zero-rate plans 
have two different consumption distributions, determined by the relative size of end users’ 
preferences of the video content over the other content, denoted by 𝛼. When 𝛼 is 
sufficiently large, the end users prefer 𝑣 content over 𝑜 content enough that consumption 
of other content is always less than data allowance, meaning 𝑜 < 𝐾0. Somogyi (2017) 
showed that large 𝛼 then leads to a distribution similar to the unlimited plan, where end 
users consume 𝛼𝐵 of 𝑣 and (1-𝛼)𝐵 of 𝑜. Relative low levels of 𝛼 mean that other content 
is preferred enough over video content and that when 𝑣 is zero-rated the end users will 
consume 𝑜 up to data allowance 𝐾0. Given a choice, they would consume more 𝑜 but are 
constrained by 𝐾0. Consumption shares are now 𝐵 − 𝐾0 for 𝑣 and 𝐾0 for 𝑜. 
 
Somogyi (2017) presented a threshold value for 𝛼: 
 
?̅?  ≡ 1 −  
𝐾0
𝐵
       (5) 
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This threshold value is dubbed attractiveness of content. Video content is attractive when 
𝛼 ≥ 1 −
𝐾0
𝐵
 and unattractive when 𝛼 < 1 −
𝐾0
𝐵
.  
Table 2. summarises consumption distributions under different plans. 
 
 Table 2. 
 𝑣 𝑜 Total Data Consumption 
Data Cap 𝛼𝐾0 (1 − 𝛼)𝐾0 𝐾0 
Zero-rate 𝛼 < ?̅? 𝐵 − 𝐾0 𝐾0 𝐵 
Zero-rate 𝛼 ≥ ?̅? 𝛼𝐵 (1 − 𝛼)𝐵 𝐵 
Unlimited Data 𝛼𝐵 (1 − 𝛼)𝐵 𝐵 
 
Data allowance 𝐾0 is identical in a data cap plan and in a zero-rated plan. If the network 
could set data allowance to a different level for zero-rating and data cap plans, the network 
would set 𝐾0 to threshold point with zero-rating. With 𝐾0 set to a level that 𝑣 becomes 
attractive, there would be no practical difference between a zero-rated plan and an 
unlimited plan, as can be seen from Table 2. It will be shown later in this section that the 
network would always set 𝐾0 at threshold point to maximize its profits. 
 
Proposition: 
A monopolistic ISP will never offer a zero-rated plan to the end users over a data cap plan 
or an unlimited plan if the ISP’s marginal cost of providing data is identical between 
options and it cannot extract payments from CPs. 
 
Proof: 
 
The network will offer a zero-rated plan only and only if  
𝜋1 > 𝜋0           (6) 
 
Where 𝜋1 is the network’s profits from the zero-rated plan and 𝜋0 is the network’s profits 
from the data cap plan with a data allowance that maximizes its profits from a range 0 <
𝐾0 ≤ 𝐵. 
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Table 2. shows that there is no difference between total consumption of data and 
consumption mix of content types between zero-rating with attractive content and 
unlimited plan. Both plans lead to similar consumption for end users, thus must lead to 
identical willingness to pay for a mobile data plan. When both plans have same total 
consumption, they will lead to cost 𝐶(𝐵) to the network. With no difference in either 
revenue or cost for the network, the network will never prefer the zero-rated plan over the 
unlimited plan. If there is a level of 𝐾0 that offers higher profits for the network than 
unlimited plan the network will never offer the zero-rated plan over the data cap plan. 
 
When 𝑣 is unattractive, consumption of 𝑜 is lower with the zero-rated plan than with the 
unlimited plan. End user’s utility is always lower with the zero-rated plan where 𝛼 is under 
the threshold point. If 𝐾0 would be increased so that the threshold point is reached end 
user’s consumption of 𝑜 content would increase, meaning that without a change in data 
budget they could achieve a higher level of utility with the unlimited plan than with a zero-
rated plan. 
 
Equations (7)-(9) show that the amount of data that the end users would like to spend to 
other content is always higher than what they are allowed under the unattractive content 
zero-rated plan. 
 
When: 
𝛼 < 1 −
𝐾0
𝐵
        (7) 
𝛼𝐵 < 𝐵 − 𝐾0       (8) 
(1 − 𝛼)𝐵 > 𝐾0      (9) 
 
Without the constraint of data allowance in the zero-rated plan the end users would 
consume more other content, reducing consumption of 𝑣 to achieve their maximum utility 
under budget 𝐵. Higher utility derived from an unlimited plan means higher willingness to 
pay for the unlimited plan and higher revenue for the network. The unlimited plan and the 
zero-rated plan have both total data demand 𝐵 and cost 𝐶(𝐵) of providing the data. With 
identical costs and higher revenue from unlimited plan, the network will never prefer the 
zero-rated plan with unattractive content over the unlimited plan. When the network would 
set 𝐾0 < 𝐵 for data cap plans, there will always exist at least one level of 𝐾0 that is more 
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preferable to the network than the zero-rated plan, in addition to data cap plan with 𝐾0 =
𝐵. 
  
Graphs 1. and 2. illustrate the differences between unlimited plans and sponsored data 
plans, where Graph 1. 𝛼 ≥ ?̅? and in Graph 2. 𝛼 < ?̅?. 
 
Graph 1. 
  
𝒗 is attractive 
Switching from data cap plan with data allowance 𝐾0 to either unlimited data or zero-rated 
plan increases utility from 𝑢0 to 𝑢1. The end users achieve same utility level with the zero-
rated plan and the unlimited plan. 
 
Graph 2. 
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 𝒗 is unattractive 
Switching from the data cap plan with data allowance 𝐾0 to the zero-rated plan increases 
utility from 𝑢0 to 𝑢1. The unlimited plan with higher consumption of 𝑜 offers higher utility 
level 𝑢2 than the zero-rated plan. 
 
The Credibility of the Assumptions 
 
The model requires some strong assumptions to keep it simple. While assumptions about 
monopolistic ISP, an identical mass of end users and certain assumptions about nature of 
the maximum consumption point do not necessarily reflect reality very accurately, relaxing 
these assumptions does not change the conclusions. 
 
Monopolistic Network 
 
Mobile data plan markets are highly competitive in both EU and United States. An 
assumption of monopoly ISP is a large deviation from reality. Increased competition 
affects prices and data allowances set by the ISPs but does not change the results. As long 
as the marginal cost of data is identical between plans there is no point for the ISPs to offer 
zero-rated plans. If one ISP sells zero-rated plans, it must either set lower average price per 
data than its competitor offering data cap plans or set same the price and lose customers to 
the competition. Both options lead to reduced profits, making the best response of the ISP 
to sell data cap plans instead of zero-rated plans. Situations where a company would prefer 
a less valuable product over more valuable one with identical costs are rare. This 
realization should carry over to most competition situations and distributions of end users’ 
valuations for mobile data plans.  
 
Multi-Period Games and Uncertain Demand for Data 
 
The model can be applied to a multi-period framework without much effort. If the same 
game is repeated over multiple periods, the results do not change. If the network can alter 
𝐾0 and 𝑃 between periods without cost, it can always find a data cap plan which offers 
equal or higher profits than a zero-rated plan. If costless switching is possible, parameter 
changes between periods do not matter for the network’s optimal strategy since data cap 
plans are optimal strategy regardless of parameter values. The data cap plan, which is an 
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optimal choice during the first period, remains the optimal plan on all of the following 
period. Every period is essentially an individual game with no direct link to previous or 
following games as the network can optimize profits individually for all of them.  
 
 
Costless switching between plans is not a very realistic assumption and the costs are often 
directed at the end users. Some mobile data plans require a minimum amount of time that 
the plans must be held before changing them. Changing plans might also cause costs for 
the end users in form of direct costs such as one-time fees required by the new plan or 
indirect costs such as search costs for the best alternative contract. 
 
Even if it is assumed that end users cannot change data plans between periods and their 
data demand is uncertain, zero-rated plans are never optimal for the network. Changing 
demand for data can be modelled by adding demand multiplier 𝜃𝑖, 0 < 𝜃𝑖 < 1, to the 
utility function. The utility is now derived from function 𝑢 = 𝜃𝑖(𝑣
𝛼𝑜1−𝛼), where 𝜃𝑖 can 
take different values in different periods. I additionally assume that end users can consume 
more data than their data allowance 𝐾0 but must either pay overcharge fees for additional 
data consumption. The network sets overcharge fees endogenously but it can be assumed 
relatively safely that the network faces larger costs when data consumption exceeds the 
data allowances. For example, the network can service all its customers with its current 
capacity when the demand is 𝐾0 but when it is larger than 𝐾0 it needs to buy additional 
capacity from outside with a higher cost. Higher cost for data for demand over 𝐾0 suggests 
that when the network sets overcharge fees, per data overcharge fees are larger than per 
data price for consumption within the data allowance. 
 
The decision in this kind of setting is where to set 𝐾0. In periods where data demanded is 
less than 𝐾0 end users will end up paying more than they gain in utility from consumption. 
In periods where demand is high, they must either pay overcharge fees or gain reduced 
utility from consumption. If changing between plans would be free, the optimal solution 
would be simply to change data allowance according to demand per period. If we assume 
that overcharge fees are larger than the cost of unused data, data allowance should be set 
higher than with earlier model. As overcharge fees increase the optimal level of data 
allowance nears 𝐵, where the end users will rather pay for the unlimited plan than pay the 
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overcharge fees. Even in this situation, zero-rating will not be a better option, since better 
results could still be obtained by unlimited plan or plans with lower data allowance. 
 
Maximum Consumption Point Assumption 
 
A maximum consumption point can be thought to be formed from multiple sources. 
Essentially, people are not able to consume an infinite amount of data in a finite amount of 
time. End users can also have other activities as Internet usage. It can be assumed that at 
the maximum consumption point end user will gain more utility from other activities, 
essentially capping Internet and data consumption to 𝐵. 
 
While the existence of a maximum consumption point is a realistic assumption, same 
cannot be said for assuming that there is a common aggregate point 𝐵 for all data 
consumption. The assumption of aggregate point 𝐵 leads us to a conclusion that if any kind 
of Internet content is removed from data allowance, this contents consumption will 
increase so much that it reaches the upper bound 𝐵. 
 
Different content types have extremely large differences on how much data they use per 
time unit. Video streaming, especially HD video streaming, is an extremely data-intensive 
activity. For example, with 10 GB monthly data allowance one can only watch HD videos 
for approximately 4 hours (AT&T Data Calculator). It can be fairly easily believed that if 
video streaming is zero-rated, even if it not very preferred by end users, total consumption 
can easily increase enough to justify assumption for aggregate maximum consumption 
point. This, however only applies to extremely data-intensive content. For example, music 
streaming is considerably less data-intensive than video streaming. Streaming music for 7 
days a week and 24 hours in a day would consume only little under 3 GB of data in a 
month. If it is assumed that there is a common maximum consumption point which is 
higher than 30% of current 10 GB data allowance, end users could never upper bound for 
total consumption by just zero-rated music streaming alone. The situation is even worse for 
data-light activities, one could send just shy of 19000 emails with 3 gigabytes or surf the 
web for 200 hours. Assuming that zero-rating even moderately data-intensive content 
could lead to the same amount of data consumption than an unlimited plan, where one also 
streams HD videos as much as one wants, is extremely unrealistic. Since ISPs do not rate 
only data-intensive content but feature multiple different data light contents in their zero-
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rated plans, as seen from Figure 3. discussion about nature of maximum consumption 
points is warranted. 
 
Assuming that there are individual maximum consumption points for all different content 
types or even content providers does not change the results in this section. In this 
framework, it would mean that there are points 𝐵𝑣 and 𝐵𝑜, 𝐵𝑣 + 𝐵𝑜 = 𝐵, for video content 
and other content respectively. End users cannot consume more video content than 𝐵𝑣 nor 
consume other content over 𝐵𝑜. Data demand with an unlimited plan is 𝐵 as both contents 
are freed to be consumed up to their respective upper bounds. With zero-rated plans, total 
data consumption is 𝐵𝑣 + 𝐾0 as end users consume up to video content’s maximum 
consumption point but are constrained in consumption of other content by the data 
allowance.  
 
When 𝑣 is zero-rated and consumption is increased to 𝐵𝑣 + 𝐾0 it is no different from the 
original model. Cost for providing that amount of data is 𝐶(𝐵𝑣 + 𝐾0), which is identical to 
the cost in a data cap plan with a data allowance of 𝐵𝑣 + 𝐾0. The data cap plan either does 
not lead to less utility than the zero-rated plan, or in case of unattractive content leads to a 
higher utility. When the content is unattractive, end users are not constrained in their 
consumption mix. With data cap plan consumption of 𝑣 will be less than 𝐵𝑣 and 
consumption of 𝑜 will be more than 𝐾0, still with the budget of 𝐵𝑣 + 𝐾0. End users can 
thus gain similar or increased utility from the data cap plan than with the zero-rated plan 
while causing identical costs for the network. Thus, the network will never favour zero-
rated plans over data cap plans. 
 
The Credibility of Assumptions: Conclusions 
 
While some assumptions made in the model have little basis in reality, in case of extremely 
data light content even requiring one to break several laws of physics to be able to use 
enough data, relaxing these assumptions did not change the inferences that one can make 
from the model. In every situation where having a larger choice over consumption mixes 
does not lead to smaller gross utility than having restrictions over choosing the 
consumption mix and costs of producing data for different contract types are identical, the 
zero-rated contract is never optimal. 
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Section IV: Zero-Rating with Transfers 
 
 
Section III discussed a situation where the network was not allowed to extract payments 
from content providers in exchange for zero-rating their data. This section discusses a 
situation where transfers between the two parties are allowed. Section IV shows that 
sponsored data plans increase the amount of data consumed in the network. Effect of 
sponsored data to social surplus, compared to data cap plans, remains ambiguous and 
depends on parameter values. 
 
Framework 
 
The monopoly ISP is not allowed to exclude any content provider from the market, i.e. 
access fee for the CPs is constrained to zero. The network collects price 𝑃 from the end 
users and is allowed to charge fee 𝐹𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑎, 𝑢 from 𝑣 content providers in exchange for 
zero-rating their content. Fee 𝐹𝑎 is charged when a content that is zero-rated is attractive 
and fee 𝐹𝑢 is charged when the content is unattractive. Other content providers can never 
be zero-rated. Identical and atomistic end users allow the network to collect all consumer 
surplus from them in form of price 𝑃. Content providers offer their content to end users 
free of charge but generate revenue from advertisements and other benefits, which depend 
on the amount of data that the end users consume in their content. Revenue generated by 
both CP types is the amount of data demanded from them, multiplied by revenue multiplier 
𝑟. Consumption of 𝐾0 amount of content will lead to revenue of 𝑟𝐾0, where 𝑟 > 0. 
Revenue generated by the content providers is not assumed to incur any costs for any agent 
in the network, outside of the costs to the network for providing the data demanded. Profits 
of the content providers are strictly increasing in the amount of data consumed in their 
content, before factoring the fee 𝐹𝑖. 
 
The network can set different data allowances for data cap plans and sponsored data plans. 
Data allowance for data cap plan 𝐾0 is set to a profit-maximizing level  
 
𝑢′(𝐾0) − 𝐶
′(𝐾0) = 0    (10) 
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𝐾0 is assumed to be exogenous when determining data allowance 𝐾1 for a sponsored data 
plan. 
 
End users’ utility is based on Cobb-Douglas utility and their data consumption is 
constrained by data allowance set by the network. When consumption of some or all 
content is not constrained by 𝐾1, total data consumption increases to the maximum 
consumption point 𝐵. This happens if the network zero-rates 𝑣-type content or it the 
network offers an unlimited plan with 𝐾1 = 𝐵. Price 𝑃 is set by the network so that it 
matches the gross utility that the end users gain from their total data consumption. With 
data cap plan, end users will consume 𝑎𝐾0 of 𝑣-type content and (1 − 𝛼)𝐾0 of 𝑜-type 
content. Threshold point ?̅? = 1 −
𝐾1
𝐵
 determines the amount of data usage for both content 
types when 𝑣-type content is zero-rated. When video content is attractive consumptions are 
𝛼𝐵 and (1 − 𝛼)𝐵 for 𝑣 and 𝑜. When video content is unattractive, i.e. 𝐾1 is set to a level 
where 𝛼 < 1 −
𝐾1
𝐵
, consumption is 𝐵 − 𝐾1 and 𝐾1 for 𝑣 and 𝑜. 
 
Video content providers’ benefit from zero-rating is determined by their revenue multiplier 
𝑟, data demand faced when zero-rated and data demand when they are not zero-rated. If 𝑣-
type content providers refuse to pay for zero-rating data plan offered by the network will 
be data cap plan, and 𝑣-type content providers face demand 𝛼𝐾0. Increased demand from 
zero-rating is then 𝛼𝐵 − 𝛼𝐾0 for attractive content and 𝐵 − 𝐾1 −  𝛼𝐾0 for unattractive 
content. This corresponds to a net benefit of 𝑟(𝛼𝐵 − 𝛼𝐾0) and 𝑟(𝐵 − 𝐾1 −  𝛼𝐾0) for 
attractive and unattractive content. Since all content providers are identical and atomistic 
the network can set fee to a level where 𝑣-type content providers are indifferent between 
being zero-rated and having data demand associated with data cap plans. The network 
achieves this by setting fees: 
  
𝐹𝑎 = 𝑟(𝛼𝐵 − 𝛼𝐾0)      (11) 
and 
𝐹𝑢 =  𝑟(𝐵 − 𝐾1 −  𝛼𝐾0)     (12) 
 
Fee 𝐹𝑎 is exogenous as the network cannot alter it in any way. Revenue multiplier 𝑟, the 
end user preference for video content 𝛼 and maximum consumption point 𝐵 are all 
exogenous by their nature. The network cannot credibly threaten to reduce data cap plan’s 
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data allowance 𝐾0, as it is at profit maximizing level if 𝑣-type content providers refuse the 
zero-rating and can also be assumed to be exogenous. 𝐹𝑢 has same exogenous parameters 
as 𝐹𝑎, but the network can influence the size of the fee since it can alter 𝐾1.  
 
The Model 
 
The timeline is following: 
1. The ISP calculates whether a sponsored data plan can achieve larger profits than a 
data cap plan. 
2. If the sponsored data plan is more profitable, then the network chooses levels for 
𝐾1, 𝑃, and 𝐹𝑖. 
3. Video content providers choose whether to pay 𝐹𝑖 and be zero-rated or not pay and 
have data demand associated with the data cap plan. 
4. The end users choose whether to pay price 𝑃 for a sponsored data plan with data 
allowance 𝐾1 and zero-rated video content or not to subscribe to the mobile data 
plan. If the network did not zero-rate video content the end users will choose 
between paying the price of data cap plan with data allowance 𝐾0 and not 
subscribing. 
 
The networks profit is generated from revenue from end users 𝑃 and fees from 𝑣-type 
content providers 𝐹𝑖 deduced by the cost of providing 𝐵 amount of data to the network 
𝐶(𝐵). When the video content is attractive, the network cannot influence its profits outside 
of deciding between the data cap plan and the sponsored data plan. When the video content 
is unattractive the network can choose 𝐾1 to maximize its profits. 
 
Profits of the network when the video content is attractive:  
(𝛼𝐵)𝛼((1 − 𝛼)𝐵)1−𝛼 + 𝑟(𝛼𝐵 − 𝛼𝐾0) − 𝐶(𝐵)      (13) 
𝑠. 𝑡.  𝛼 ≥ 1 −
𝐾1
𝐵
  
 
When video content is unattractive the network maximizes profits by: 
max 𝐾1: (𝐵 − 𝐾1)
𝛼 𝐾1
1−𝛼 + 𝑟(𝐵 − 𝐾1 − 𝛼𝐾0) − 𝐶(𝐵)     (14) 
𝑠. 𝑡.  𝛼 < 1 −
𝐾1
𝐵
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Sponsored Data Plan with Attractive Video Content 
 
If the network sets 𝐾1 ≥ (1 − 𝛼)𝐵, 𝑣-type content is attractive, and profits of the network 
come from equation (13). At this level of  𝐾1, profits of the network are exogenous as 𝐾1 
does not affect anything in the function. With 𝐾1 over the threshold point, the end users are 
not bound by the data allowance, as their consumption of the 𝑜-type content is (1 − 𝛼)𝐵 
with total data budget of 𝐵. When 𝐾1 is set to a level where video content becomes 
attractive the end users are not bound in their consumption by anything else than the 
maximum consumption point 𝐵. Sponsored data plan with attractive video content 
essentially becomes an unlimited data plan, but the network can extract payments from the 
𝑣-type content providers. 
 
Sponsored data plan with attractive video content will increase social surplus if 𝐾0 < 𝐵. 
Gross consumer surplus is increased since data consumption increases from 𝐾0 to 𝐵 and 
consumption mix between 𝑣-type content and 𝑜-type content does not change between the 
plans. Video content providers’ gross surplus is increased from 𝑟𝛼𝐾0 to 𝑟𝛼𝐵 but the 
difference is extracted by the network by fee 𝐹𝑎. Profits of the 𝑜-type content providers are 
increased, end users’ data consumption in their content is increased from (1 − 𝛼)𝐾0 to 
(1 − 𝛼)𝐵 and the network cannot extract any payments from them.  
 
If the network would offer sponsored data plan with attractive video content no party 
would lose any surplus and some parties would gain some surplus. However, section V 
will show that the network can always get higher profits by setting 𝐾1 under the threshold 
point, meaning that sponsored data plans with unattractive video content are always more 
profitable to the network than sponsored data plans with attractive video content. As the 
network can freely choose the level of 𝐾1, it will never offer sponsored data plans with 
attractive video content. For this reason, rest of the thesis focuses on the unattractive 
option. 
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Sponsored Data Plan with Unattractive Video Content 
 
The network maximizes its profits with equation (14). The problem of the network is that 
𝐾1 influences both price 𝑃 = ( 𝐵 −  𝐾1)
𝛼 𝐾1
1−𝛼 and fee  𝐹𝑢 = 𝑟(𝐵 −  𝐾1 − 𝛼𝐾0). When 
the network reduces the data allowance 𝐾1 it increases profits from the video content 
providers, as their share of total data consumption increases. Reducing the data allowance 
decreases the end users’ utility as they are driven further from their optimal consumption 
mix, which reduces the price that the network can collect from the end users. 
Costs of the network are fixed as the total data consumption is set to 𝐵. The network’s 
dilemma is to find a level of 𝐾1 which balances between 𝑃 and  𝐹𝑢 and maximizes its 
profits. 
 
First order condition for the profit function (14) w.r.t. 𝐾1 is: 
 
−𝛼
 𝐾1
𝐵− 𝐾1
1−𝛼
+ (1 − 𝛼)
 𝐾1
𝐵− 𝐾1
−𝛼
− 𝑟 = 0    (15) 
 
Equation (15) cannot be explicitly solved for a profit-maximizing level of 𝐾1. Numerical 
solutions for the profit-maximizing level of 𝐾1 with different parameter values can be 
easily calculated with any optimization tool. Even though 𝐾1 cannot be derived from 
equation (15) to explicit function form, equation (15) can be used to gather important 
information about nature of sponsored data plans. Taking total derivative from equation 
(15) makes it possible to see how 𝐾1 behaves when different parameters are changed. 
 
Calculating partial derivatives of 𝐾1, 𝐵 and 𝑟 from equation (15) yields:  
 
𝐹𝐾 =  
𝐵
( 𝐾1−𝐵)2
(
 𝐾1
𝐵− 𝐾1
𝑎
+
 𝐾1
𝐵− 𝐾1
−𝑎−1
)     (16) 
𝐹𝐵 =  
 𝐾1
(𝐵− 𝐾1)2
(
 𝐾1
𝐵− 𝐾1
𝑎
+
 𝐾1
𝐵− 𝐾1
−𝑎−1
)    (17) 
𝐹𝑟 =  −1        (18) 
 
Where 𝐹𝐾 is the partial derivative of (15) with respect to  𝐾1, 𝐹𝐵 the partial derivative of 
(15) with respect to 𝐵 and 𝐹𝑟 the partial derivative of (15) with respect to 𝑟. 
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Proposition: 
For the ISP to maximize its profits any changes in B must be met with identical relative 
changes in 𝐾1 and any changes in 𝑟 require 𝐾1 to change in opposite direction. 
 
Proof: 
The rate of change between 𝐾1 and 𝐵: 
 
−𝐹𝐵
𝐹𝐾
=  −
𝐾1
𝐵
     (19) 
 
 
And the rate of change between 𝐾1 and 𝑟 
 
−𝐹𝑟
𝐹𝐾
> 0      (20) 
 
Exact calculations for equations (19) and (20) can be found from Appendixes 1 and 2. 
 
Effect of the Maximum Consumption Point on the Data Allowance 
 
With data cap plans, maximum consumption point does not affect data consumption of the 
end users or any decisions of the network as long as 𝐾0 < 𝐵. For an unlimited data plan, 
the network’s revenues and costs are determined by the level of the maximum 
consumption point.  
 
Sponsored data plans with unattractive video content level of 𝐵 affects the network’s 
choice for level of 𝐾1. Equation (19) shows the rate of change between 𝐵 and 𝐾1 and 
shows that maximum profits are reached by parallel changes to 𝐾1 for different levels of 𝐵.  
Larger level of the maximum consumption point will increase the profits of the network, 
but the network maximizes its profits by matching changes in 𝐵 with similar changes in 
𝐾1. For example, assume that the network optimizes its profits and sets 𝐾1 at some initial 
parameter values. Doing the optimization again with 20% higher value of 𝐵 will lead to a 
new profit-maximizing value of 𝐾1, which is 20% higher than the initial value of 𝐾1. Not 
changing 𝐾1 with 20% higher 𝐾1 will increase profits of the network but increasing it by 
20% will increase the profits even more. 
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Effect of the Revenue Multiplier on the Data Allowance 
 
Level of the revenue multiplier 𝑟 naturally affects revenues of the content providers. Level 
of 𝑟 also affects 𝑣-type content providers’ willingness to pay for zero rating. Higher levels 
of 𝑟 are associated with a larger difference in revenue between the sponsored data plans 
and the data cap plans. The absolute difference between revenues between sponsored data 
plan with unattractive video content and data cap plans is dependent on the level of 𝑟. 
Larger levels of 𝑟 also lead to higher willingness to pay for zero rating by the 𝑣-type 
content providers, as can be seen from equation (12). 
 
The equation (20) shows that there is an inverse relationship between 𝑟 and 𝐾1. Higher the 
revenue multiplier is, lower the network will set the data allowance. This can be best 
understood through the two revenue streams of the network: 𝑃 and 𝐹𝑢. Decreasing 𝐾1 
reduces the end users’ willingness to pay for the data plan but increases the amount of data 
that the end users use to 𝑣-type content providers, increasing their willingness to pay for 
zero-rating. The network sets 𝐾1 to a point, with given parameter values, where increasing 
it any further would increase 𝑃 less than it would decrease 𝐹𝑢 and vice-versa for decreasing 
𝐾1. With higher values of 𝑟, this point comes later if we imagine 𝐾1 to gradually reduced 
until reaching this point. When the revenue multiplier is low, the network places more 
focus on the revenue from the end user side and is more focused on their utility. With high 
revenue multiplier, a larger share of the network’s potential revenue comes from 𝑣-type 
content providers’ side and lower values of 𝐾1 are set to take this into account. 
 
The rate of change between 𝐾1 and 𝑟 allows for further analysis of differences between 
sponsored data and data cap plans, namely size of data allowance in two contract types. 
Only the case of unattractive video content is considered since the network will always 
choose a sponsored data plan with unattractive video content over a sponsored data plan 
with attractive video content.  
 
Consider a situation where 𝑟 is set to a low-value 𝜀, which is near 0. I additionally assume 
that 𝑟 = 𝜀 is enough to incentivize the network to offer a sponsored data plan instead of a 
data cap plan. With 𝑟 =  𝜀, 𝐹𝑢 is close to zero and the network will set 𝐾1 close to 
maximizing the utility of the end users. Consumption of 𝑣 and 𝑜 are close to 𝛼𝐵 and 
(1 − 𝛼)𝐵. Total data consumption is increased if 𝐵 > 𝐾0. When 𝑟 starts increasing 𝐾1 
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decreases and moves further away from (1 − 𝛼)𝐵. The consumption of 𝑜 decreases while 
𝑣 increases. When 𝑟 is high enough, the network sets 𝐾1 = (1 − 𝛼)𝐾0, making 
consumption of 𝑜-type content identical between the plans. This level of 𝑟 offers increased 
consumer surplus as consumption of 𝑜 is identical between the plans but consumption of 𝑣 
is larger with the sponsored data plan. When 𝑟 increases even further and 𝐾1 shrinks the 
sponsored data plan leads to lower consumption levels of 𝑜, but the utility from increased 
consumption of 𝑣 still eclipses the utility losses from lower consumption of 𝑜. With high 
enough 𝑟, 𝐾1 will be set low enough that consumer surplus from the sponsored data plan 
will be lower than with the data cap plan as the increased consumption of 𝑣 can no longer 
offset the reduced utility from consumption of 𝑜.  
  
Depending on the levels of 𝑟 and 𝐵, it is possible to determine three different points in the 
consumer surplus 
1. 𝑣, 𝑜 and the gross consumer surplus are larger with the sponsored data plan than 
with the data cap plan. 
2. 𝑣 is larger and 𝑜 is lower with the sponsored data plan. Benefits from the large 𝑣 
offset losses from the lower 𝑜, and the gross consumer surplus is larger. 
3. 𝑣 is larger, and 𝑜 is lower with the sponsored data plan. Benefits from the increased 
𝑣 do not offset the utility losses from the lower 𝑜 and the gross consumer surplus 
are smaller with the sponsored data plan. 
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Section V: Numerical Solutions 
 
A drawback of the Sponsored Data model presented in Section IV is that it’s impossible to 
find an explicit formula for the profit-maximizing 𝐾1. Numerical solutions can, however, 
be found as the profit function of the network has a clear maximum point for all 
combinations of parameter values. These profit-maximizing values of 𝐾1 can be easily 
found with any common optimization tool. This section presents some numerical results 
for the model and discusses their implications. These results work in conjunction with rates 
of change for 𝐵 and 𝑟, presented in equations (19) and (20). Graphs in this section show 
how larger values of 𝑟 will lead the ISP to set a lower level of 𝐾1 and increases in 𝐵 will be 
met with identical and parallel changes in 𝐾1. This section adds to the previous section, 
showing how increased end user preference over video content 𝛼, reduces the optimal level 
of 𝐾1. Finally, section V presents numerical results which suggest that the network will 
never set 𝐾1 in such way that it crosses the threshold point ?̅?  ≡ 1 − 
𝐾1
𝐵
, as it will always 
gain higher profits by setting 𝐾1 to such value that zero-rated content is categorized as 
unattractive and not attractive content. 
 
Effect of the Revenue Multiplier on the Data Allowance 
 
By looking at Graphs 3 and 4, it can be clearly seen that 𝑟 reduces the optimal value of 𝐾1. 
Regardless of the parameter values, increased revenue of the video content providers will 
lead to the network setting a lower value of 𝐾1. This effect happens in a similar fashion 
across different levels of 𝛼 and 𝐵, with 𝐾1 decreasing gradually as 𝑟 increases. A notable 
difference to the general trend happens when 𝛼 = 0.1. With this low level of 𝛼, the 
optimal level of 𝐾1 at first decreases at a relatively slow speed but starts decreasing rapidly 
as 𝑟 increases. This can be most likely attributed to the fact that with 𝛼 = 0.1, end users 
prefer the 𝑜-type content heavily and any reduction to 𝐾1 in sponsored data setting will 
lead to them losing much surplus and trough that the network losing profits from the end 
user side. With small 𝑟, the gains that the network gets from 𝑣-type content providers by 
reducing 𝐾1 are not enough to offset the losses from end user payments if 𝐾1 is reduced too 
much. When 𝑟 starts to increase, the situation changes. Since 𝑣-type content is not 
preferred by the end users, gains in data consumption that the 𝑣-type content providers will 
get when they are zero-rated are large. When 𝐾1 is reduced to a lower level, the end users 
will distribute a large share of their maximum consumption to 𝑣-type content, as they have 
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no other options, outside of using the small amount of data marked by 𝐾1 to 𝑜 content. 
When this large increase in the demand faced by 𝑣-type content providers is coupled with 
larger levels of 𝑟, the network will start to gain larger and larger profits from the content 
provider side of the market. These gains start to offset the losses from the end user side to 
even smaller and smaller levels of 𝐾1, meaning that 𝐾1 will decline rapidly and will end up 
to extremely small value with large enough values of 𝑟.  
 
The situation can be easily compared to the series in Graph 3 where 𝛼 = 0.8. With this 
high value of 𝛼, video content is very preferred by the end users and the network is 
incentivized to set 𝐾1 at a low level even with small levels of 𝑟. The end users would not 
use much of their data to consume 𝑜 content anyway. The reason for the network to set 𝐾1 
at initially small levels and reducing it slowly are due to the fact that while 𝑣-type content 
providers will face large demand when zero-rated as 𝐾1 is set so low, they have the option 
to refuse from zero-rating. By turning down the offer they will face lower consumption in 
total, but it will gain a large share of the reduced consumption, without the network being 
able to extract any payments from it. By setting 𝐾1 lower than threshold point the ISP will 
lose profit from the end user side and only gain a small amount of profit from CP side. 
When 𝑟 increases it will be more profitable to reduce 𝐾1 a bit but the effect is gradual and 
not as large as we saw with a situation 𝛼 = 0.1.  
 
 
Graph 3 
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Graph 4 shows that 𝐵 affects the optimal level of 𝐾1, with 𝑟 nearing 0 the optimal level of 
𝐾1 is set near to the threshold point. Increases in 𝑟 all gradually reduce optimal level of 𝐾1. 
 
 
 
Graph 4 
 
 
Effect of the Maximum Consumption Point on the Data Allowance 
 
Graphs 5 and 6 show that optimal level of 𝐾1 increases in parallel with 𝐵. Any change in 
𝐵 will be met with an identical change in 𝐾1, regardless of levels of 𝛼 or 𝑟. For example, 
Graph 5 shows that with 𝛼 = 0.2, the network will maximize its profits by setting 𝐾1 =
5.74 when 𝐵 = 10 and 𝐾1 = 14.35 when 𝐵 = 25. With 𝐵 2.5 times larger profit-
maximizing level of 𝐾1will also be set at 2.5 larger level. 
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Graph 6 
 
 
Effect of End User Preferences on the Data Allowance 
 
Section IV does not include mathematical formulation on effects of the end user preference 
of video content, 𝛼, to 𝐾1, but it stands to reason that larger values of 𝛼 will tend to 
decrease the optimal level of 𝐾1. As discussed earlier in this section, this is mainly due to 
end user preferences. Larger levels of 𝛼 mean that end users prefer to consume 𝑣 content, 
thus high levels of 𝐾1 are not required. The network will always set 𝐾1 lower than the 
threshold point, which means that higher 𝛼 leads to lower 𝐾1. With high 𝛼 the consumers 
prefer to consume 𝑣 content, decreasing 𝐾1 thus reducing their consumption possibilities of 
𝑜 and increasing the amount that they consume 𝑣 does not hurt their utility as much as with 
low levels of 𝛼. While high 𝛼 reduces the ability of the ISP to extract payments from the 
CPs. 
 
From Graphs 7 & 8 it can be clearly seen that while increases in 𝑟 lead to lower levels of 
𝐾1 and increases in 𝐵 to higher levels of 𝐾1, increasing 𝛼 rapidly reduces the optimal size 
of 𝐾1. 
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Graph 7 
 
 
Graph 8 
 
Profits with Attractive and Unattractive Content 
 
The profit function of the network is defined differently for over and below the threshold 
point. Profits of the network are determined by equation (13) when the network sets 𝐾1 to 
equal over exceed the threshold point. When 𝐾1 is under the threshold point the profits are 
determined by equation (14). If the network sets 𝐾1 over the threshold point it effectively 
relinquishes control over the prices in the network. It can no longer alter 𝐾1 to influence its 
profits. The network has two options. Either to set 𝐾1 to profit-maximizing value under the 
threshold point or set it at the threshold point.  Graphs 9 and 10 suggest that the network 
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will always earn higher profits when 𝐾1 is under the threshold point. While this notion is 
not mathematically proven in this thesis, numerical results strongly suggest this. 
 
 
Graph 9 
 
Graph 9 shows that the network always profits more from setting the video content to be 
unattractive. For low values of the revenue multiplier, 𝑟, the difference in profits of the 
options is negligible. This can be understood in conjunction with Graph 3. When 𝑟 is 
small, 𝐾1 is set near to the threshold point, naturally leading to small differences between 
the profit functions. As 𝑟 increases optimal 𝐾1 for unattractive content decreases and the 
difference in profits starts to increase. From Graph 9 additionally shows that gap in profits 
for different levels of 𝛼 is almost non-existent when 𝑟 is small, for larger values of 𝑟, 
smaller values of 𝛼 start yielding larger profit differences between options.  
 
 
 
Graph 10 
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Graph 10 shows the evolution of the total profit difference between unattractive video 
content and attractive video content and its different components, profits from the end 
users and profits from the 𝑣-type content providers, across different values of 𝛼. The profit 
difference between the options is always positive. The network is always able to extract 
more profits from the video content providers when their content is unattractive, even 
though the difference between the options diminishes as 𝛼 approaches 1. Contrary to the 
total profits and profits from video content providers, revenue from the end users is higher 
for the network when the video content is attractive. While the network gains larger 
revenues from end users by setting 𝑣-type content to be attractive, the effect of larger 
profits from content provider side with unattractive video content always dominates the 
first effect and the network is always better off with unattractive video content.  
 
The graphs clearly show that there always exists a value of 𝐾1 under the threshold point 
which leads to higher profits for the ISP than setting 𝐾1 ≥ 𝐵 −  𝛼𝐵. Further analysis can 
thus be focused on situations where the network sets the data allowance under the 
threshold point. 
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Section VI: Welfare Effects of Sponsored Data 
 
There are four parties which are influenced by zero-rating. The network, the end users, 
video content providers and other content providers. This section discusses welfare effects 
of sponsored data to these parties, compared to data cap plans, when the network sets 𝐾1 
under the threshold point. Technically the end users and video content providers are 
always indifferent between sponsored data plans and data cap plans since the network 
exercises its monopoly power and reduces their benefits from it to zero. The network’s 
revenue streams are however discussed separately, to allow for better understanding of 
situations where the network cannot extract all surplus.  
 
For the network, the surplus analysis is trivial. The network chooses whether to offer 
sponsored data plans or data cap plans. If sponsored data plans do not lead to higher profits 
for the network, it will not offer those. The network’s revenue from the video content 
providers is always larger with sponsored data, as it does not exist with data cap plans.  
 
The network’s revenue from the end users is largely dependent on the parameter values 
and can be lower or higher with sponsored data. The first effect of the sponsored data is 
that the end users are forced to a new worse consumption mix, where they are forced to 
consume less other content than they would like. This reduction in utility is balanced by 
increased total consumption as their total data consumption is increased from 𝐾0 to 𝐵. Data 
allowance 𝐾1 sets a limit for consumption of 𝑜, limiting the end users’ utility from its 
consumption. Depending on the level of 𝑟 and 𝐵 reduction of 𝑜 can be offset by increased 
consumption of 𝑣, but as 𝑟 increases the ever-smaller data allowance leads to more utility 
losses than gain from larger consumption of 𝑣, reducing end users’ willingness to pay. 
 
The surplus of 𝑜-type content providers depends on the total data consumption that they 
face, 𝐾1. If the jump in total data consumption is high enough, the network is incentivized 
to set 𝐾1 at a relatively high level, possibly increasing other content providers profits. 
When 𝐾1 > (1 − 𝛼)𝐾0 𝑜-type content providers are better off than before. If the network 
sets 𝐾1 at a lower level, their surplus is reduced. When 𝐾1 is set to a low level, the end 
users were at least partially compensated with increased consumption of video content, but 
there isn’t any such mechanism for the 𝑜-type content providers, which are undoubtedly 
worse off than before when 𝐾1 < (1 − 𝛼)𝐾0. 
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Social surplus is measured by:  
 
 
Δ𝑆𝑆 =  Δ𝑃 + Δ𝐹𝑢 + Δ𝑜𝑆 − C(B) − C(𝐾0)     (21) 
Where: 
Δ𝑆𝑆 = Change of social surplus between plans 
Δ𝑃 = Change of end user price between plans 
Δ𝐹𝑢 = Change video content provider fees between plans 
Δ𝑜𝑆 = Change of other content producer surplus between plans 
C(B) − C(𝐾0) = Change in costs of the network between plans 
 
Δ𝑃 + Δ𝐹𝑢 − C(B) − C(𝐾0) > 0 is the individual rationality constraint of the network. 
Δ𝑃 + Δ𝐹𝑢 is the change in revenue for the ISP while C(B) − C(𝐾0) shows a change in 
costs when changing from data cap plan to sponsored data. Change in social surplus is 
ambiguous between the two plan types and depends whether increased profits of the 
network are higher than potential losses for other content providers. When the network 
maximizes its profits by setting 𝐾1 to a high enough level, 𝑜-type content providers are 
better off than with data cap plans and social surplus is increased with sponsored data 
plans. With lower levels of 𝐾1, additional profits of the network might not be enough to 
cover losses of the 𝑜-type content providers, leaving society worse off than before. 
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Section VII: Discussion 
 
This section discusses limitations of models presented in the thesis, suggests reasons why 
ISPs zero-rate content without collecting payments from the content providers and 
suggests some possibilities for future research. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
 
A mathematical framework for zero-rating presented in this thesis is best suited for data-
intensive content. While it is my firm belief that in the future zero-rating will be focused 
mainly on data-intensive content, at least in developed countries, this limits the scope of 
the study. This section will, however, present an alternative framework, which can be used 
to understand ISPs decisions to zero-rate data-light contents in their sponsored data plans. 
Another major limitation of the framework is that it requires an assumption that there are 
only two content provider types, where one can never be zero-rated. 
 
Maximum Consumption Points 
 
Much of this thesis rests on assumption that there is a common maximum consumption 
point for all Internet content. An end user will always reach this maximum consumption 
point when consumption of even one content type is not restricted by the data allowance. 
This assumption limits use of the framework to more data-intensive content. It is not 
realistic to assume that an individual would reach similar amounts of data consumption 
with a plan that zero-rates some data-light content like instant text messaging as the 
individual would reach with an unlimited data plan, assuming that the individual prefers to 
use even some data-intensive content. The framework still works well for data-intensive 
uses of the Internet.  
 
Assuming that the end user has individual maximum consumption points for all different 
content types on the Internet, where maximum consumption points for data-intensive 
content are higher than those of data-light content, results of zero-rating are essentially 
same for pooled maximum consumption point and individual maximum consumption 
points. If the pooled maximum consumption point is thought as an aggregate of all the 
individual maximum consumption points and it is assumed that the video content’s 
maximum consumption point will be extremely large the analysis does not change. By 
zero-rating video content, consumption of video content will be at its individual 
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consumption point. Consumption of other content will not be at its maximum consumption 
point, but the data allowance allows for some consumption of this content. Now if the 
zero-rated plan would be changed to unlimited plan consumption of video content would 
not increase, but consumption of other content would increase from the amount set by data 
allowance to its maximum consumption point. When the video content plays a major factor 
in total data consumption, this change from zero-rating video content to allowing unlimited 
consumption of all content will only increase total data content by a small amount. With a 
small enough increase in total consumption from this, it can be argued that individual 
maximum consumption point of video content does not differ meaningfully from a 
maximum consumption point for all content. 
 
The fact that the framework is best suited for data-intensive content allows further 
speculation. For the pooled maximum consumption point to be realistic option large share 
of data consumption of end users would need to come from watching video content, given 
unlimited consumption options. This suggests that when zero-rating video content or 
similar data-intensive contents when all of the other content is relatively data light, 𝛼 will 
be large. As seen from Graph 10, with high levels of 𝛼 the network’s profits are not much 
higher with unattractive content than with attractive content, suggesting that data 
allowances in these options are fairly similar. With sponsored data and attractive content, 
total surplus is always higher than with data cap plans since no party will be left worse off. 
The network is always better off if they decide to offer sponsored data. The end users are 
not constrained in their consumption mix and can consume more data. Other content 
providers are also always better off with attractive content since end users will consume 
more of their data than before. With this information, it can be speculated that when video 
content is heavily preferred by the end users, the ISP will not set the data allowance to very 
low levels, compared to the threshold point. This suggests that there is a chance that social 
surplus might be increased with this kind of sponsored data plans. 
 
Discarding pooled maximum consumption point assumption affects the analysis 
considerably. Under the pooled consumption point assumption costs of the ISP are set 
exogenously as consumption jumps to 𝐵. Allowing 𝑣 and 𝑜 to have individual maximum 
consumption points 𝐵𝑣 and 𝐵𝑜, the cost function stops being a non-factor in the analysis as 
it is now determined endogenously by the ISP. Costs are determined now by the cost 
function 𝐶(𝐵𝑣 + 𝐾1). ISPs profits from 𝑣-type content providers are now exogenous as 
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data consumption that the 𝑣-type content providers will face will be 𝐵𝑣 and data 
consumption without zero-rating will still be set to 𝛼𝐾0. Revenue from 𝑣 side will now be 
𝑟(𝐵𝑣 − 𝛼𝐾0). Now the ISPs profit maximization dilemma is a simple problem of finding 
the point where marginal revenue from the end users by increasing 𝐾1 equals marginal 
costs of increasing 𝐾1. The ISP can treat costs and revenues arising from consumption of 
video content as fixed. 
 
Content Providers 
 
Limiting the amount of different content provider types to two does not limit the analysis 
considerably. Adding more content provider types to the model would complicate the 
mathematics behind the analysis considerably without adding important additional 
information. Lumping all content providers outside of the content providers that get zero-
rated does not reduce information gained from the model. The 𝑜-type content providers do 
not actively influence any decisions, so nothing is lost when lumping them together.  
 
The assumption that 𝑜-type content providers can never be zero-rated limits the analysis 
somewhat. There is no technical limitation to not allow unlimited consumption of any kind 
of content on the Internet. Allowing the two content provider types to compete over being 
able to be zero-rated would complicate the analysis as it introduces a game theoretical 
situation where either none of them gets zero-rated, only one does or both do. When 
neither of them gets zero-rated the ISP just offers a data cap plan and with both types being 
zero-rated ISP just offers unlimited plans to end users. Only the situation where the ISP 
exclusively zero-rates one CP type is a “true” zero-rating. While analysis could then be 
focused on exclusive zero rating this will change payoffs of the ISP from the CP side 
further complicating the calculations as now the CP, which gets exclusive zero-rated, is no 
longer willing to pay all profits stemming from the zero-rating to the ISP but the maximum 
amount that the losing CP type would have been willing to pay for the zero-rating. The 
only situation where 𝑜-type content can be assumed never to be zero-rated is a situation 
where their maximum willingness to pay for it would never cover increased costs of the 
ISP. In this situation, the ISP never considers 𝑜-type for zero-rating and it does not affect 
𝑣-type’s willingness to pay.  
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Limiting the analysis is also the assumption that the video content providers do not possess 
any market power and do no actively compete with each other. All video content providers 
act as one and receive an equal share of end users’ consumption towards their category. 
Assuming multiple CPs in one content category would complicate the analysis again. The 
situation would be similar to CP types competing over zero-rating, leading to similar 
game-theoretical considerations. For more information on how two perfect substitutes 
competing over zero-rating affect ISPs revenue from CP side see Somogyi (2017).  
 
Why do ISPs Zero-Rate Content for Free? 
 
Results from the “no transfer model” are interesting. When the price that the ISP can 
charge from CPs in exchange for zero-rating their content is constrained to zero, the ISP 
should never be inclined to offer zero-rated plans instead of data-allowance plans. This 
conclusion is in stark contrast to reality. Section II described some common zero-rating 
practices in use both in the United States and Europe. Especially European ISPs commonly 
zero-rate content without requiring payments from the CPs, which seems contradictory to 
findings in Section III. The fact that zero-rating without payments from content providers 
is so common suggests that zero rating offers some other forms of monetary gains to the 
ISPs, outside of the model considered in Section II. 
 
Marketing 
 
One possible reason for ISPs zero-rating content without any direct payments is marketing. 
An ISP zero-rating some popular content on the Internet can use this offer in their 
marketing efforts and be more attractive to consumers than its competitors. The hypothesis 
is supported by the fact that the commonly zero-rated contents in Europe seem to be 
content that is popular among Internet users, such as Skype, YouTube or Spotify. It can be 
safely assumed that zero-rating popular content is more likely to increase consumer 
demand for mobile Internet plans of the ISP rather than zero-rating less popular content 
that is only used by part of the consumers in the market. In addition to identifying popular 
services that are often zero-rated in Europe, Aetha, Oswell & Vahida and DotEcon Ltd. 
(2017) find that European ISPs commonly either zero-rate a single content provider or a 
bundle of similar content providers. Both allow the ISP to promote the zero-rating as an 
edge against the competitors. 
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Zero-rating a single service makes the ISP more attractive for current users of the 
aforementioned service since now they can use it to their heart’s content. Bundling similar 
services together employs a similar tactic. For example, offering a collection of video-
streaming services to be zero-rated for their customers the ISP is instantly more attractive 
for all people who prefer to stream videos on their mobile devices. By offering a bundle 
they capture a larger segment of the market than just by offering just one service, albeit 
with a higher cost of increased data consumption. This, however, captures all consumers 
who prefer just one service in the bundle and makes the offer increasingly attractive to 
consumers who regularly use multiple video streaming platforms. By focusing on a bundle 
of similar content the ISP can better focus its marketing efforts than just offering a random 
assortment of popular services on the Internet, regardless of the category. It can be 
assumed that sending a message of being “the ISP of choice” for consumers who like to 
stream videos is a better marketing strategy than offering a bundle of services from 
different categories. 
 
Customer Retention and Price Competition 
 
Zero-rating content without direct payments from content providers can be useful for the 
ISPs even outside of marketing purposes. In addition to attracting new customers interested 
in the content that the ISP zero-rates there is a possibility to increase customer retention 
and reduce price competition between ISPs via zero-rated plans. European ISPs are 
generally competitive in their pricing practices, especially since mobile data plans can be 
seen as close substitutes to each other as the only variables in the Internet connection are 
often prices and the data allowances. The ISPs often try to reduce this price competition by 
various means such as locking their customers by offering fixed-period plans in exchange 
for some benefit to the customers. One such example could be an ISP selling a packet of a 
brand-new phone and mobile data connection to that phone for a relatively cheap monthly 
combined price but require the customer not to switch ISPs for next two years. In addition 
to “locking in” their customers, the ISPs offer various side-benefits to their customers, 
such as Finnish ISP Telia, which offers free Spotify Premium subscription to all its 
customers. (Telia.fi). Offering a service which normally costs something to consumers 
naturally works as a promotional tool but offers an advantage in reducing price 
competition between the ISPs. By offering free Spotify Premium to its customers Telia 
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makes sure that even if its competitors undercut its prices the customers are less likely to 
switch since they would lose their benefits from the free Spotify premium. Generally, the 
ISPs data plan offers are complicated and include multiple different deals bundled in one, 
in addition to just the normal Internet connection, which makes comparing prices between 
competitors harder, reducing the price competition between the ISPs. Zero-rating can work 
in similar fashion. Zero-rating certain content on the Internet, while competing ISPs zero-
rate different content the ISPs effectively fragment the market and lessen price 
competition. Now to capture customers from another carrier the ISP must either zero-rate 
same contents that the other carrier zero-rates or reduce the price of mobile data plans 
enough to offset utility losses from losing zero-rating in your preferred content on the 
Internet due to switching to new ISP.  
 
Zero-Rating and Vertical Integration 
 
Vertical integration of content providers and ISPs can explain some part of the prominence 
of the “no transfer” zero-rated plans. Choi & Kim (2010) argued that vertical integration 
with sponsored data does not cause any antitrust concerns and that the ISPs would not 
favour their own content providers over non-affiliated content providers with higher 
margins in discriminatory regimes. This notion might hold when the ISPs are not able to 
extract payments from content providers. Zero-rating content from non-affiliated content 
providers gains the indirect benefits discussed before but it cannot extract direct payments 
from the CP. When the ISP zero-rates content providers that it owns it gains all of the 
benefits of zero-rating non-affiliated content provider and the benefits that the content 
provider gains from zero-rating. This makes zero-rating enticing prospect for vertically 
integrated ISPs.  
 
In the United States AT&T and Verizon zero-rate their own video streaming platforms and 
while the platforms are technically open for third parties, for payment, they mostly zero-
rate only their own video streaming services. While the option for third-party CP to pay for 
zero-rating does not fit exactly in the context, there is a point to be made that the situation 
resembles a situation where no transfers can happen if either the payments required by 
AT&T and Verizon are high enough for third-party CPs to find not profitable to join. 
(AT&T and Verizon haven’t disclosed prices for zero-rating.)  
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When the ISPs are incentivized to zero-rate their own content over non-affiliated content, 
antitrust problems might be present. Vertically integrated ISPs commonly zero-rate their 
own video streaming services, which are exceedingly data intensive and can eat a large 
fraction of one’s data allowance in short timeframe. While zero-rating ISPs own CPs can 
be potentially very lucrative for the ISP, the practice distorts competition between video-
streaming platforms on the Internet. Consumers faced with the choice of choosing to view 
video content between ISPs own zero-rated video streaming platform and their preferred 
platform, from which they can only stream a limited amount of video face a tough choice. 
Especially in situations where data allowances are relatively small this kind of practice has 
a chance of hampering innovation as third-party CPs cannot compete against the ISPs own 
platform due to the zero-rating. 
 
Zero-Rating as an Insurance 
 
There is an argument to be made that limited knowledge of the end users could be a reason 
why zero-rating practices exist even when there is no direct monetary gain for the ISPs 
from CP side of the market. It can be relatively easily assumed that the end users have 
imperfect information on how much of their monthly data allowance is left and how data-
intensive different contents are. A normal end user might have a general idea on the data 
costs, knowing that video-streaming costs more data per minute than instant messaging, 
but it’s unreasonable to expect that they would have very accurate information on this. 
Then the argument can be made that zero-rating can work as an insurance. When an end 
user goes over his/her monthly data allowance ISPs often either set overcharge fees or start 
throttling the connection. Overcharge fees can be surprisingly large and the effect of your 
Internet connection slowing to a crawl can be infuriating. It makes sense that end users 
generally try to avoid going over their monthly data allowances.  
 
If individual maximum consumption points are assumed instead of a pooled maximum 
consumption point, then zero-rating the data-intensive content can work as an insurance for 
the end users. With a data cap plan, the end users need to worry that consuming data-
intensive content puts them over their monthly data caps. The end users or the ISP cannot 
solve this problem by increasing the data allowance. Larger data allowance leads to 
increased consumption across all content types. The end users would consume more but 
the underlying problem would not be solved. They would still fear going over their data 
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allowances with data-intensive content. One solution for this is zero-rating the data-
intensive content. The end users would no longer need to fear that the content which is 
most likely to put them over their data allowances would cause that since it is zero-rated. 
This action can be relatively cheap or very costly for the ISPs, depending on types of the 
end users. An end user who does not stream a lot of videos would probably not stream 
many videos even when their consumption is not limited. The end user would not increase 
his/her total consumption considerably, causing limited cost increases for the ISP, but 
would reap full benefits of the insurance effect. End users preferring to consume video 
content would likely to increase this consumption sizably if the consumption would be 
free. For these end users, the insurance aspect of zero-rating is less important than the 
utility gained from increased consumption. Section II suggest that the ISP would not do 
better by zero-rating content for end users like these, as it could always achieve better 
results by simply increasing the data allowance.  
 
The problem for the ISP is that by zero-rating the data-intensive content they are offering 
their customers insurance and a real benefit but at same increasing their costs a lot if 
enough of their customers increase their data consumption dramatically in response to the 
zero-rating. Since the ISPs are not easily able to discriminate between the customer types 
in this situation, some ISPs have already found an alternative solution to their dilemma. 
Both T-Mobile and Deutsche Telekom zero-rate a large bundle of content for their 
customers, but with a catch. Their customers can enjoy a large amount of content without 
any fears of ever going over their data allowance, but the quality of their video streaming is 
constrained. T-Mobile constrains streaming quality to 480p (T-Mobile.com) and Deutsche 
Telekom reduces the video quality to SD (480p). Germany’s Federal Network Agency has 
however taken issue with Deutsche Telekom’s practice. Agency had no issue with zero-
rating in general but prohibited quality reduction practiced by Deutsche Telekom. (Krieger, 
2017) 
 
The practice of combining zero-rating and quality degradation of video streaming can 
work to alleviate the problems of higher data consumption while preserving the insurance 
part of zero-rating. While the ISP allows its customers unlimited consumption of certain 
content, lower quality streaming reduces the data consumed per video, limiting the costs of 
the ISP. Nature of zero-rating means that the consumers do not need to worry about going 
over their limits when consuming zero-rated content.  
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Zero-rating as insurance cannot credibly explain all zero-rating plans in the market. While  
insurance provided by zero-rating works well in the context of zero-rating data-intensive 
content, the benefits are considerably smaller when the ISPs zero-rate content that does not 
consume much data, such as Facebook. If the end users are aware that just browsing 
Facebook or using Facebook messenger does not use much data, they are not particularly 
afraid that using these services will take them over their data allowances, making offering 
an insurance for Facebook only marginally beneficial for the end users. It’s more likely 
that these instances where the ISPs zero-rate data-light content are based on alternative 
explanations rather than the insurance argument. 
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 
A potential avenue for new research would be to expand the model from monopoly setting 
to a more competitive scheme. As mobile internet market is competitive both in the USA 
and Europe, further research studying duopoly models would be beneficial. Introducing a 
competitive environment for ISPs can definitely alter the results of the analysis. The 
current framework can be used to model duopoly competition, but the analysis is more 
complicated. In monopoly setting the ISP only functions in one dimension, the ISP sets 
data allowance 𝐾1 which determines prices for end user sides and CP sides. In a duopoly 
setting, the price is no longer tied completely to 𝐾1, as the ISPs can set the prices under the 
monopoly prices charged under the current framework.  
 
Nature of the Internet suggests that duopoly is best modelled by bottleneck competition as 
is done by Jullien & Sand-Zantman (2018). The end users are single-homing, only 
subscribing to one of the networks, while CPs are multi-homing, subscribing to both of the 
networks. The model presented in this thesis behaves, as one would expect, similarly to 
other two-sided market models with bottleneck competition. Both ISPs will charge 
monopoly payments from the CPs. Industry profit from the CPs will remain identical to 
monopoly model and the ISPs will end up splitting the profits as they now both share half 
of the market, assuming that they are identical. End user side of the market will, however, 
change dramatically by adding a competing network to monopoly setting. The networks 
compete over end users, pushing the price under one from monopoly setting.  
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Price competition over end users will lead to zero profit situation for both of the ISPs if 
they are perfect substitutes. If one sets lower price than the other it will capture the whole 
market. The ISPs push the prices down, substituting losses from end user side with profits 
from the video content provider side of the market. Lowest price that the ISPs are willing 
to offer for the end users is the price, which combined with their profits from video content 
providers covers their costs.   
 
In addition to competing over prices, the networks compete over data allowance set to the 
end users. In practice, this means that the networks will set the data allowance in such 
fashion that it maximizes combined surplus of the end users and the network. When both 
of the networks have set the data allowance to a point where this surplus is maximized 
neither has an incentive to defect from this equilibrium. Increasing prices would lead to the 
end users switching to the other ISP and reducing prices would lead to losses. Lowering 
the data allowance would also cause all end users to leave the ISP. Increasing the data 
allowance would increase the amount that the end users are willing to pay but reduce 
payments from the video content providers more. The ISP would need to increase prices 
more than the additional willingness to pay from the end users to stay aloft, losing all 
customers to the competition. Thus, the only equilibrium can be one where both ISPs 
charge monopoly prices from video content providers, charge zero-profit prices from the 
end users and set the data allowance to a point which maximizes the combined surplus of 
the ISPs and the end users.  
 
The only difference between monopoly and duopoly situations is the price charged from 
the end users. A monopoly ISP will extract all consumer surplus from the end users while 
with a duopoly the ISPs will set zero-profit prices for the end users which could even be 
negative. Interestingly the data allowance will be set to the same point with both options, 
maximizing the combined surplus of the network(s) and the end users. With a duopoly 
situation, the data allowance arises from the necessity of competition. The monopoly ISP 
arrives at the same point since it maximizes the combination of gross consumer surplus 
and profits from the video content providers.  
 
Expanding the monopoly model to a duopoly model with a more formal framework would 
allow us to expand our understanding of sponsored data. These models can be altered to 
accommodate more heterogenous end users or to assume that there are multiple video 
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content providers competing for zero-rating. The ISPs can be even assumed not to be 
perfect substitutes but for the end users to have a preference for one ISP over other, 
reducing the competition between them. 
 
Another avenue in research is using zero-rating for price discrimination. Identifying 
situations where ISPs can use this strategy to heterogenous end user masses would be 
informative. An ISP could use zero-rating as a way to make the end users self-select into 
categories based on their preference of the zero-rated content and extract more surplus 
from the end users. 
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Section VIII: Conclusions 
 
 
One of the main conclusions this thesis arrives is that when a monopoly ISP cannot charge 
fees from the content providers, it will never offer zero-rated plans for homogenous end 
users. The framework presented in Section III shows that the ISP cannot increase its 
revenue by increasing end users’ willingness to pay more with zero-rating than by 
increasing their data allowances. Zero-rating increases the total consumption but restricts 
end users’ choice of the consumption mix, forcing them to use a larger share of their data 
consumption to the zero-rated content than they would prefer and forcing them to use a 
smaller share to other content. The ISP can always find a data-allowance with a data cap 
plan which leads to similar consumer valuation thus revenue than zero-rating with either 
smaller or identical costs. Reasons for ISPs offering zero-rated plans to their customers 
must derive from different reasons. Potential examples discussed in this thesis are using 
zero-rating for marketing reasons or to increase customer retention and to reduce price 
competition. Zero-rating can also potentially work as an insurance for the end users, 
making sure that consuming zero-rated content does not cause them to go over their 
monthly data allowances. 
 
When the ISP is allowed to charge payments from the content providers it zero-rates it will 
always set the data allowance to a level where the zero-rated content is unattractive. This 
level of data-allowance leads the end users using a larger fraction of their total data usage 
to the zero-rated content than they would if they were not restricted in their choice of 
consumption with a similar budget. There always exists a level of data allowance which 
restricts consumption choices of the end users which gives the ISP higher profits than 
sponsored data plan which data allowance is set to high enough level not to constrain end 
users’ consumption choices. Both the price for end users and the fee collected from the 
zero-rated content providers is determined by the data allowance. Larger data allowance 
increases the end users’ willingness to pay as the restrictions in consumption of the not 
zero-rated content are relaxed. Smaller data allowance, while reducing the price from the 
end users, increases fees collected from the zero-rated content providers. Smaller data 
allowance reduces the amount of data the end users can use the content that is not zero-
rated causing them to substitute it with the zero-rated content, increasing its consumption. 
The ISP sets data allowance, thus the prices for end users and the fees for zero-rated 
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content providers to a level which equalizes marginal revenues from them. Level of data 
allowance with a sponsored data plan is mainly influenced by three factors: revenue 
multiplier of the content providers, maximum consumption point of the end users, and the 
end users’ preference of the zero-rated content. Revenue multiplier increases fees per unit 
of data collected from the zero-rated content providers reducing the data allowance. 
Maximum consumption point affects the data allowance in a 1:1 ratio, where larger 
maximum consumption point leads to an identical parallel change in the data allowance. 
Larger consumer preference of the zero-rated content over other content leads to smaller 
data allowances. Data allowance is also influenced by total data consumption with 
alternative data cap plan. 
 
Total welfare differences between sponsored data plans and data cap plans depend on two 
opposite effects. Sponsored data leads to utility loss for the end users and other content 
providers due to the forced suboptimal consumption mix. Secondly, sponsored data 
increases the total amount of data consumption increasing the end users’ utility. If the total 
increase in consumption is enough to offset the lower share of other content consumption, 
profits of the other content providers can increase. Change in social surplus is greatly 
dependent on the parameter values and can be either positive or negative. If the ISPs 
increased profits are higher than profits lost by the other content providers, then sponsored 
data increases the social surplus. If the zero-rated content is extremely data-intensive thus 
takes a large share of end users’ total consumption even when the consumption mix is not 
restricted social surplus is likely to be increased. Large consumer preference of the zero-
rated content over the other content leads the ISP setting data allowance to a level where it 
close to not restricting consumption of the end users. At this level, consumption is 
distorted slightly but all parties in the network can benefit from increased consumption of 
data. The social surplus with this kind of sponsored data plan is still worse than unlimited 
data plan but fees collected from the zero-rated content providers can cause additional 
incentive for the ISP to expand capacity. 
 
Size of the data allowance is not affected if the competition situation is changed from a 
monopoly to a duopoly. Both set data allowance to a level which maximizes gross end user 
surplus plus profit from zero-rating of the zero-rated content providers. Monopoly ISP 
maximizes its own profits at this point since it collects both. Duopoly ISPs set identical 
fees to the CPs as the monopoly but subsidize the end users with their profits from content 
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provider side of the market setting zero-profit prices for the end users which can, in theory, 
be negative. 
 
Tie-in to Other Research 
 
My thesis aims to build on top of works of Somogyi (2017) and Jullien & Sand-Zantman 
(2018). Adding to Somogyi’s framework, I allow for the data allowance to be 
endogenously determined. While my framework does not provide the reader with a 
specific formula for ISPs pricing decisions based on the data allowance, it allows the 
reader to understand how different parameters affect the data allowance and through the 
data allowance prices for both end users and content providers. Jullien & Sand-Zantman 
formulate a specific pricing structure for the ISP but approach the concept of sponsored 
data as a price discrimination situation. Their framework includes two kinds of CPs based 
on their margin of profit and finds that sponsored data can be used to better direct the end 
users towards more profitable content providers, improving the network’s efficiency. 
(Jullien & Sand-Zantman 2018). Their framework is more focused on the CP’s ability to 
create value through profits that they earn. There can be, however, a large contrast between 
the ability of a CP to generate cash flow per data used and utility created to end users from 
consuming data of this CP. A framework such as Cobb-Douglas utility function for end 
users can better allow consumer preferences to affect their choice of data usage between 
content providers instead of all CPs gaining an identical amount of consumption. This kind 
of framework can help us better understand that zero-rating does not only increase the 
efficiency of consumption by increasing consumption of higher margin CPs but alters 
consumer behaviour. Sponsored data can alter end user behaviour in such ways that they 
are guided away from consuming content which would create more utility for them and 
towards lower utility consumption, while the ISP partly compensates this via increased 
consumption. 
 
Importance of Zero-Rating 
 
Studying the effects of zero-rating is important for a multitude of reasons. It is common 
practice both in Europe and in the US, and after the abolishment of Obama era net 
neutrality regulation in the US, it is likely that zero-rating is going to be more prevalent in 
the future. Combined with other discriminatory practices such as paid prioritization, zero-
rating has a power to shape how we use the Internet in the future. Potential benefits and 
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problems need to be recognized but there is also a question of how important zero-rating 
will actually be in the future.  
 
Unlike paid prioritization zero-rating touches only a part of our digital lives. Data 
consumption with mobile phones is still only approximately half of the total Internet 
consumption and the share is even lower in developed countries. The prominence of using 
mobile phones as means of reaching the Internet is, however, increasing rapidly. While 
mobile data usage reached the 50% mark in 2017, five years earlier mobile data usage 
constituted only roughly 10% of total data usage. (Statista, 2018). Paid prioritization 
affects all types of Internet connections, while zero-rating is almost exclusively a mobile 
data issue. Fixed cable connection plans are in almost all instances unlimited plans, where 
the determining factor of your plan is the speed of your connection. Constraining factor in 
mobile plans is the data allowance and not speed of connection, as mobile plans often have 
similar speeds.  
 
Size of data allowances also matters when we question the importance of zero-rating. Even 
in some developed countries like Germany, mobile data plans are expensive and only offer 
small data allowances. (Rewheel, 2016). In countries like these, zero-rating some content 
can have large effects on consumption mix of the end users. The situation is reversed in 
countries with high data allowances. If consumers can already consume large amounts of 
data, making some of the consumption free would not cause major changes. It is possible 
to argue that zero-rating is less effective in high data-allowance countries and thus matters 
less in the context of network neutrality. This theorem has some caveats, however. It can 
be assumed that technology-driven increases in average data allowances have effects on 
end user behaviour. When data allowances increase it stands to reason that given unlimited 
data the maximum amount that the end users will consume will increase too, at least over 
time. If the growth of how much people will consume with unlimited data is slower than 
the growth of data allowances, the importance of zero-rating will fade over time. When 
countries reach the stage where virtually all mobile data plans offer unlimited data issue of 
zero-rating should vanish altogether. This is evident from Finland, where most of the 
mobile data plans offered are unlimited data plans, and possibly as a result no ISP 
operating in Finland offer zero-rate plans (Aetha, Oswell & Vahida and DotEcon Ltd., 
2017). Even if the issue of zero rating will fade over time, there is still the question what 
happens in between and how long it will take. Dynamic effects of net neutrality have been 
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studied thoroughly with scholars split on the issue. Chen et al. (2011) argue that the ISPs 
have reduced investment incentives under discriminatory regimes, while Choi & Kim 
could not conclude that the ISPs would not slow the pace of investments. Krämer and 
Wiewiorra (2012) took an opposite view and claimed that investments are likely to 
increase without net neutrality. All these studies focused on net neutrality issue in general 
but are likely to be applicable to zero-rating too. If sponsored data practices become widely 
used by the ISPs and it does indeed slow growth of ISP investment, issue of zero-rating 
and net neutrality in general will be a topic of heated discussion for a long time.  
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